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Human error has been identified as the primary contributing cause for up to 80% 
of the accidents in complex, high risk systems such as aviation, oil and gas, mining and 
healthcare. Many models have been proposed to analyze these incidents and identify their 
causes, focusing on the human factor. One such safety model is the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), a comprehensive accident investigation 
and analysis tool which focuses not only on the act of the individual preceding the 
accident but on other contributing factors in the system as well. 
Since its development, HFACS has received substantial research attention; 
however, the literature on its reliability is limited. This study adds to past research by 
investigating the overall intra-rater and inter-rater reliability of HFACS in addition to the 
intra-rater and inter-rater reliability for each tier and category.  For this investigation, 125 
coders with similar HFACS training coded 95 causal factors extracted from actual 
incident/accident reports from several sectors. The overall intra-rater reliability was 
evaluated using percent agreement, Krippendorff‟s Alpha, and Cohen‟s Kappa, while the 
inter-rater was analyzed using percent agreement, Krippendorff‟s Alpha, and Fleiss‟ 
Kappa. Because of analytical limitations, only percent agreement and Krippendorff‟s 
Alpha were used for the intra-rater evaluation at the individual tier and category level and 
Fleiss‟ Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha, for the corresponding inter-rater evaluation.    
The overall intra-rater and inter-rater results for the tier level and the individual 
HFACS tiers achieved acceptable reliability levels with respect to all agreement 
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coefficients. Although the overall intra-rater and inter-rater reliability results at the 
category level were lower than the tier level, both types of reliabilities achieved 
acceptable levels with inter-rater reliability being lower than intra-rater. In addition, the 
intra-rater and inter-rater results for the individual HFACS categories varied from 
achieving low reliability levels to being acceptable.  
Both the inter-rater and intra-rater results found that the same 5 categories among 
the 19 – Skill Based Error, Decision Error, Inadequate Supervision, Planned 
Inappropriate Operations, and Supervisory Violation – were lower than the required 
minimum reliability threshold. While the overall findings suggest that HFACS is 
reasonably reliable, the fact that there were 5 categories with low reliability levels 
requires further research on ways and methods to improve its reliability. One such 
method could be to focus on training by designing and developing a standard HFACS 
training program that improves its reliability, which will have the potential to enhance 
both the confidence in using it as an accident analysis tool and the effectiveness of the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Impact of Accidents 
Industrial facilities and plants continually experience serious accidents and 
incidents, specifically during their construction and operations phases. In the U. S. in 
2011, industrial accidents caused approximately 3,600 fatalities and 5.1 million disabling 
injuries (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011), representing on average a death rate of 1 
every 2.5 hours and an injury rate of 1 every 6 seconds. These accidents and injuries have 
a significant impact.  
The estimated total costs of industrial accidents in 2009 were approximately 
$168.9 billion, including wage and productivity loss ($82.4 billion), medical ($38.3 
billion), administrative ($33.1 billion), motor vehicle damage ($2 billion), employers‟ 
uninsured costs ($10.3 billion), and fire loss costs ($2.8 billion) (National Safety Council, 
2011). In addition, a central economic cost of industrial accidents is the insurance 
premiums. According to Liberty Mutual (2011), the estimated direct U.S. workers 
compensation costs for disabling workplace injuries and illnesses in 2009 totaled      
$50.1 billion. According to Mossink and De Greef (2002), no matter the preliminary 
costs associated with the accident, the indirect costs go beyond the visible ones, 2-20 
times larger (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2006). These expenses 
include, but are not limited to, lost production time, employment time lost by an injured 
employee, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) penalties. These 
data reveal that although knowledge and technology have reduced the number of 
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accidents and improved safety, industrial accidents are still a serious concern, one 
needing further research.  
1.2 Causes of Accidents 
Based on current thinking, the causes of accidents involve the interaction of 
technical, environmental, organizational, and human factors (Reason, 2008; Sharit, 2006; 
Shorrock, 2011). A well-known factor that has received significant research attention is 
the technical failure of a component in a system. These factors involve equipment 
malfunction and failure resulting from design flaws such that the system no longer meets 
its designed specifications. 
Environmental factors involve such physical surroundings of the operators 
or equipment that could adversely affect performance as weather conditions, noise, and 
illumination. For instance, the analysis of General Aviation (GA) databases from 2003 
through 2007 shows that of 8,657 aviation accidents, 1,740 were weather-related either as 
the primary cause or as a contributing factor (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010). 
Recent disasters like Chernobyl and the Challenger crash have brought 
considerable awareness to the organizational factors contributing to an accident (von 
Thaden, Wiegmann, & Shappell, 2006). While the Chernobyl disaster was caused by a 
poor safety culture, specifically infringements of safety rules (Salge & Milling, 2006),                                           
a major contributing factor in the Challenger accident was NASA‟s poor communication 
system (Heimann, 1993). Organizational factors also include inadequate procedures and 
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training; insufficient standards, requirements, and processes; and company/management-
induced pressure. 
Human causal factors are associated with human error, defined by Reason (1990) 
as “encompassing all those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical 
activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be 
attributed to the intervention of some chance agency.” Similarly, Senders and Moray 
(1991) concluded that human error results when the actions that were intended by the 
operator generate a production status beyond the acceptable limits or are not required by 
certain standards. Examples of human error include, but are not limited to, inattention, 
memory lapses, complacency, and mistakes. While there have been significant reductions 
in accidents resulting from technological failures, industrial incidents/accidents due to 
human error have significantly increased, representing a contributing cause of up to 80% 
(Aas, 2008; Peters & Peters, 2006). Table 1.1 lists a wide range of industries including 
their percentage of human error contributing to accidents. 
 
  Table 1.1: Human Error Contribution to Accidents across Industries 
Industry Percentage 
Aviation (GA) 70 - 80 % 
Petrochemical 41 % 
Marine 74 % 
US Coast Guards 80 - 90 % 
Healthcare (Anesthesia) 82 % 
Sources: (Shappell et al., 2007); 
                             (Butikofer, 1986); 
               (Trucco, Cagno, Ruggeri, & Grande, 2008);  
                             (Aas, 2008); 
               (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000)   
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1.3 Managing Human Error  
As humans are limited in their capabilities and are inherently fallible, the primary 
objective of any safety professional is to identify resulting errors, reduce their chances of 
occurrence, and minimize their impact. These can only be achieved by gaining 
information on the safety status of the organization or company, information usually 
collected in an incident/accident report. However, because textual data are difficult to 
analyze, the use of safety taxonomies is of vital importance. The advantage of such an 
approach enables safety professionals to develop a safety database, allowing them to 
efficiently analyze the information, searching for patterns, similarities, and trends among 
incidents/accidents. The resulting analysis can assist not only in the development of data-
driven safety interventions and mitigation strategies, but also in evaluating their 
effectiveness.   
One of the most important safety taxonomies is the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) (Harris & Li, 2011), a comprehensive accident 
investigation and analysis tool which focuses not only on the act of the individual 
preceding the accident but on other contributing factors in the system (environmental, 
supervisory, and organizational). Figure 1.1 highlights the areas where HFACS can be 
applied in the error process loop. As a primary accident investigation tool, it assists 
accident investigators in their search for causal factors, active and latent, within each 















As a secondary analysis tool, HFACS evaluates a collection of accidents, looking 
for trends which point to weaknesses in certain areas. For example, Wiegmann & 
Shappell (2003) analyzed 14,571 GA accidents from 1990 to 1999 using HFACS, finding 
that skill-based errors were the dominant type of aircrew errors as seen in Figure 1.2; 
therefore, safety strategies need to be directed towards reducing such errors. In addition, 
despite slight fluctuations, the data indicate that the error trends have not changed 
significantly over time, suggesting that the safety intervention efforts directed towards 
any of these errors have had no significant effect on them. 




Figure 1.2: Percentage of Nonfatal US GA Accidents Associated with Unsafe Acts 




As an advanced analytical tool, HFACS can identify recurrent error pathways 
among its categories, providing the system safety professional with additional 
information to guide resources towards a more focused intervention. For example, 
Company X has identified a significant error pathway which includes resource 
management, failure to correct known problem, technical environment, and skill-based 
errors. As a result, it can allocate intervention resources towards resource management to 







1.4 Research Problem and Contributions  
One of the fundamental issues concerning the utility of HFACS involves the 
classification of the incident/accident causal factors to the HFACS causal categories. The 
accuracy of this process, referred to as coding, which is accomplished through multiple 
raters, reflects the reliability of HFACS. Differences may occur between coders at a 
specific time (inter-rater reliability) or within coders (intra-rater reliability) over time.  
If the same incident/accident is coded differently by more than one person or the 
coding results vary for the same person over a certain time frame, the detection of unique 
events becomes unachievable, implying that the frequency counts of events derived from 
the coding process are meaningless leading to ineffective mitigation/prevention plans, 
and in the end reducing the margin of safety of the system. The aim of coding via 
HFACS is to obtain frequencies that reflect the safety status of the system irrespective of 
who arrives at the classification (Wallace, 2008).  
The reliability of HFACS has been called into question because of the limited 
research studies investigating its inter-rater and intra-rater reliability, a concern as more 
industries and organizations are adopting HFACS as an accident investigation analysis 
tool. Although its developers (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2003) achieved high reliability, 
recent reliability assessments have been less reassuring (Olsen, 2011). Methodologies 
assessing the reliability of HFACS vary across past studies in terms of the number and 
experience of the coders, the statistical methods, and the industrial sector accident 
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database used, making it difficult to synthesize their results and draw practical 
conclusions.  
To address this issue, the primary goal in this research is to assess the reliability 
of HFACS, both intra-rater and inter-rater, as a general accident investigation analysis 
tool using accident data from a variety of industries. In addition, this study aims to use a 
large number of coders, more than 120, all having a similar level of experience. 
Furthermore, to thoroughly assess and investigate the reliability of HFACS, four 
statistical procedures – the percent agreement, Krippendorff‟s Alpha, Cohen‟s Kappa, 
and Fleiss‟ Kappa – were used. In addition, this research aims to evaluate the reliability 
of all HFACS tiers and categories, thereby identifying specifically which of these need 
further attention and improvement.  
The second chapter of this dissertation analyzes the previous research in the fields 
of human error and human error taxonomies and frameworks, concentrating on the 
HFACS taxonomy and its validation criteria. The third chapter presents the methodology 
used in this study, including the subjects, instruments, data collection and the statistical 
methods and packages used. While the fourth chapter provides the results of this 
research, the fifth presents a detailed description and discussion of the significance of the 
results. The final chapter of this dissertation includes concluding statements of the 






CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Human Error 
In general, human error is viewed as an inappropriate or unacceptable human 
decision or action that degrades, or has the potential of degrading, efficiency, safety, or 
system performance (Sanders and McCormick 1993). Currently, human error is 
frequently cited in safety sources as the major contributing cause of several significant 
industrial disasters such as Bhopal, and Chernobyl (Helmreich, 2000; Sarter & 
Alexander, 2000; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001), one that will continue as humans are 
inherently fallible. Much of this research has focused on the theoretical and empirical 
study of human error. While some were cognitively oriented, others have taken a more 
holistic approach. 
  Significant research on human error conducted by Rasmussen (1982) defined 
three levels of human behavior based on the level of cognition involved, knowledge-
based, rule-based, and skill-based behaviors. Knowledge-based activities are those 
involved in creating a plan to solve a new situation or problem. While rule-based 
behaviors are activities that are conducted using a set of stored instructions or procedures, 
skill-based behaviors are routine activities conducted spontaneously. With experience and 
practice, performance shifts from knowledge-based to skill-based; further, the level of 
conscious demand increases as we transfer from skill-based to rule-based reaching the 
highest conscious control levels for knowledge-based  activities. 
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Reason (1990; 1995) supplemented Rasmussen‟s work by defining the error 
associated with the human behavior as “unsafe acts” committed by an operator at the 
front line preceding an adverse event. Unsafe acts take many forms including slips, 
lapses, mistakes, and violations, the first two being execution failures that usually occur 
when the plan of action is adequate but the actions performed are not carried out as 
intended. These two are related to failures of attention, recognition, memory, or selection. 
On the other hand, mistakes occur when a plan is completed as anticipated, but it proves 
to be inadequate to achieve its intended outcome. 
 The last form of unsafe acts, violations, which are classified as either routine or 
exceptional, include deviations from the established rules and regulations that increase 
the probability of committing an error resulting in a negative outcome (Reason et al., 
1998). While routine violations represent less serious departures from rules and 
regulations tolerated by authority personnel, thus habitual in nature, exceptional 
violations are severe departures from rules and protocols that are not condoned by such 
personnel.  
More recently, Sarter and Alexander (2000) categorized human error based on 
operator task performance as either errors of omission or commission. Whereas errors of 
omission occur when an operator fails to execute a necessary task at the intended time, 
errors of commission occur when the operator carries out an action in the inappropriate 
way or at the imprecise time, such classification affects the likelihood to detect errors. 
While human errors have been categorized in various ways to identify actions that 
threaten the safety of both the employees and plant, the lack of common definitions and 
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criteria for coding them has limited the ability to compare data across companies and 
industries, perhaps contributing to the continuing frequency of accidents due to human 
error (O'hare, 2000).   
2.2 Human Error Models 
As a concept, human error has traditionally been viewed in two ways: the earlier 
persons approach and the more recent systems approach described by Reason (2000). In 
the mid-twentieth century, the persons approach was dominant, with systems being 
considered error-free and needing to be protected from the unreliable humans committing 
errors and violations at the sharp end, operational level, causing failures (Woods, Dekker, 
Cook, Johannesen, & Sarter, 2010). In this approach, errors occur due to such 
psychological factors in an individual as forgetfulness, poor motivation, inattention, 
carelessness and complacency. Since this responsibility lies solely on the individual, the 
recommendations for addressing such errors included automation, training, employee 
selection, development of in-depth procedures, and the firing of the operator whose 
actions led to the accident; however, these steps were ineffectual as human error 
continued to be a major cause of accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). 
To address this situation, many accident models have been proposed to 
understand accidents and the role of human error within them. These single element 
models included the physiological perspective (Suchman, 1961), the behavioral 
perspective (Peterson, 1971), the organizational perspective (Bird, 1974), the cognitive 
perspective (Rasmussen, 1982; Wickens & Flach, 1988), and the psychosocial 
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perspective (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993). Table 2.1 presents a description of these 
perspectives: 
 
Table 2.1: Perspectives of Human Error Models (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) 
Perspective Focus Advantage Limitation 
Physiological Focuses on the physical 
and/or  physiological 
conditions of the 
operator that influence 
performance 
 Highlighted the role 
of the physical status 
of the operator in safe 
performance 
 Shaped military and 
industry view of 
fatigue 




rest policies  
 Lack of consensus 








and whether these 
factors caused the 
error  
    
Behavioral Is based on the 
identification of 
incentives that reward 
safe behavior and/or 
punishes unsafe acts. 
Considers that errors 
are often due to unsafe 
acts that result from 
misplaced motivation.  
 Emphasizes the role 
that motivation plays 
in influencing safe 
behavior  
 Suggests accidents 
occur when 
individuals lack the 
motivation to 
perform safely  
 Motivation to be safe 
is self-directed 
because the result of 
unsafe acts are 
frequently fatal 
 No distinction 
between unsafe acts 
that are motivation-
driven such as 
violations and those 
that are cognitive 
driven such as errors. 
    
Organizational Considers that errors 
are often due the rules, 
regulations, and 
procedures that are set 
by the organization; 
focuses on accident 
failures within the 
organization  
 Broadens the field of 
inquiry in studying 
and preventing 
human error 
 Suggests the ability 
to manage human 
error within the 
context of risk. 
 Lacking information 
about the types of 
organizational 
variables that cause 
specific errors. 
 Focuses on a single 
type of causal factor. 
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Cognitive Treats the mind as an 
information processing 
system, the goal being 
to detect issues of this 
information processing  




 Identifies specific 
error trends to 
develop intervention 
strategies  
 Not easily applicable 
 Focuses only on the 
human, disregarding 
other factors such as 
task-related factors 
and organizational 
factors that impact 
performance 
    





teams and errors are 
identified within this 
context 
 Emphasizes the role 
of interpersonal 
aspects of human 
performance  
 Led to the 
development of Crew 
Resource 
Management (CRM) 
in aviation, which 




members in the 
cockpit. 
 Limited information 
for formulating and 
testing psychosocial 
models of human 
error.  
 CRM is comprised of 
the psychosocial 
model among others  
 
However, during the last two decades, the view of human error has shifted from 
the persons to the systems approach. In this approach, human error is viewed as a 
symptom of deeper failures in the system rather than the failure of the human who is 
essential in creating safe systems (Woods, Johannesen, Cook, & Sarter, 1994).                                                                                    
As a result, safety professionals focus on examining the system to reveal the latent 
factors, the organizational and technical elements, that created the conditions causing the 
operator to commit an error. Examples of latent factors include poor design, maintenance 
failure, ineffectual automation, inadequate supervision, manufacturing defects, 
inadequate training, inappropriate or poorly defined procedures, and inadequate 
equipment (Reason, 1997). Therefore, human error is no longer considered the major 
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cause of incidents/accidents; instead, it is viewed as an outcome of the latent conditions 
in the system. Comparisons of these two approaches can be seen in Table 2.1 below:  
 
Table 2.2: Comparison between Persons and Systems Approach to Human Error   
Element Persons Systems 
System Safe Unsafe 
People Unreliable 
Reliable and central to 
creating safety 
Cause of accident Operator at the front end 
(Human error) 
Operator errors are 
indications of deeper 
failures in the system 
farther up-stream 
  
As in the persons approach, many models have also been proposed in the systems 
approach to understand the role of human error. While some models aid in the 
investigation process of accidents, others provide a systematic way of understanding 
them (Toft, Dell, Klockner, & Hutton, 2012). The systems approach models, which 
include a combination effect of many factors including human error contribution to 
accidents, include the  SHEL Model (Edwards, 1988; in  Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003),  
the Swiss-cheese model (SCM) (Reason, 1990; 2008), the wheel of misfortune (O'hare, 
2000), the incident cause analysis method (ICAM) (Gibb, Hayward, & Lowe, 2001),                                     
and the human factors analysis and classification system (HFACS) (Wiegmann & 




2.2.1 SHEL Model 
 One of the most familiar system models is Edwards‟s (1973) Software, 
Hardware, Environmental Conditions, and Liveware (SHEL) model seen in Figure 2.1. 
The software is concerned with the rules and regulations that manage and run the systems 
operations, while the hardware involves the tools, equipment, material, and physical 
supplies. Third, the environmental conditions include the physical conditions such as 
ambient temperature and illumination, and finally, the liveware refers to the people 
working in the system. When any of these components or their connections fail, system 
failure results. Although the model includes the primary components of the system, a 



















2.2.2 Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) 
One of the most largely regarded system models of accident causation is Reason‟s 
(1990) Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) (Aas, 2008; Perneger, 2005).  In this model, Reason 
proposes a systems approach to human error, which takes into consideration that humans 
are prone to error; thus, barriers and safeguards are developed to prevent system 
breakdown. Reason (1990) explains that accidents can be tracked to four levels of failure: 
unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational 
influences. The ideal system resembles a stack of slices of Swiss cheese, as seen in 
Figure 2.2, the cheese representing the barriers and safeguards against failure, while the 
holes represent the errors still remaining. The system is prone to an accident when the 
holes, errors, in each level in the system line up. 
 




 The holes or errors in the defensive system are the active and latent failures that 
cause nearly all accidents (Reason, 2000).  An active failure, which is the act of the 
operator resulting in an immediate accident/incident, is usually apparent, meaning it can 
quickly be attributed as the cause of an accident. On the other hand, latent errors, which 
are hard to detect, usually occur at higher organizational levels and may reside in the 
system for an extended period of time.  
The second version of the SCM, Mark II, shown in Figure 2.3, reduced the 
number of levels, and hence, the defenses to three: organization, task/environment, and 
individual. Further, it included a latent failure path leading from the organization directly 
to the defenses, a path that takes into account accidents not involving active failures, for 
example the Challenger accident (Reason et al., 2006).  




In 1997, Reason developed a third version of the SCM, Mark III, shown in Figure 
2.4. In this version, the top rectangle represents the components of an incident/accident 
with undefined defenses, whereas the lower triangle illustrates the system producing the 
event: unsafe acts of operator, local workplace conditions, and organizational factors. The 
arrows differentiate the directions in which an accident occurs and in which it is 
investigated. The main concept in the three versions is that incidents/accidents are a result 
of latent and active failures within the system composed of the organization, 
environment, and individuals that interact negatively with one another, thus breaching the 
defenses of the system and producing loss.  
 
 
Figure 2.4:  Mark 3 Version of the SCM (Reason, 1997) 
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The wide acceptance of the Swiss Cheese Model results from the fact that it 
integrates a majority of the human error perspectives previously described. However, it 
lacks practicability: the lack of identification of the failures, the nature of the holes, at all 
levels cause the model to be purely theoretical, benefitting academicians rather than 
practitioners. Accordingly, practitioners such as analysts and safety investigators 
encountered problems when applying this model to real incidents/accidents (Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 2003).   
 
2.2.3 Wheel of Misfortune 
The Wheel of Misfortune taxonomy is a general classification framework 
proposed by O‟Hare (2000) to be used as a guideline to reveal the causes of an accident 
during an accident investigation. This model is primarily based on Helmreich‟s (1990 as 
cited in O'Hare, 2000) and Reason‟s (1990) work and is composed of three concentric 
spheres as illustrated in Figure 2.5.  The innermost sphere represents the actions of the 
individual operator, based on Rasmussen‟s (1982) skill-rule-knowledge behavior 
classification. The middle sphere represents the local conditions that affect operator 
performance, including such external conditions as weather conditions and the internal 
state of the operator including excessive fatigue, distraction, and alcohol consumption, to 
mention a few. The outermost sphere represents the overall conditions created by the 
organization in which the task activity takes place, for example organizational policies. 
The innermost sphere, local actions, explains the results, i.e. the accident, based on the 




          Figure 2.5: The Wheel of Misfortune  (O’Hare, 2000) 
 
 
2.2.4 Incident Cause Analysis Method  
The Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM), also based on Reason‟s Swiss 
Cheese Model (1990; 1997), is a reactive investigation tool developed by BHP Billiton 
(Gibb, Hayward, & Lowe, 2001), that identifies the local and latent factors contributing 
to an incident within the system and organization. In addition, it develops 
recommendations and solutions to system deficiencies and vulnerable organizational 
processes to prevent future incidents/accidents.  The ICAM model classifies causal 
factors into four elements: absent/failed defenses, individual/team actions, 
task/environmental conditions, and organizational factors (De Landre, Gibb, & Walters, 
2006), as shown in Figure 2.6. First, the absent/failed defenses identify the factors that 
failed to detect and protect the system against technical and human failures or the control 
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measures that did not prevent the incident or limit its consequences. Second, the 
individual/team actions include the errors or violations of the operator that led directly to 
the incident. Third, task/environmental conditions involve those circumstances that 
directly impact human and equipment performance prior to or at the time of the 
incident/accident. Finally, organizational factors are the underlying means generated by 
the organization that influence the performance of employees in the workplace. Through 
the analysis of the four elements, ICAM enhances the ability to identify the causes of the 
incident/accident and to develop improvement strategies aimed at building error-tolerant 





















2.2.5 Human Factors Analysis and Classification System  
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is a human 
error taxonomy developed to provide a comprehensive framework to identify and classify 
causal factors of incidents/accidents; then based on these data, safety interventions can be 
developed and subsequently, their effectiveness evaluated (Shappel & Wiegmann, 2000).                                                                          
Currently, HFACS is the most extensively used human factors accident analysis 
framework (Harris & Li, 2011). Using Reason‟s SCM (1990) as a basis, Wiegmann and 
Shappell (1997; 2000) developed this system. HFACS identifies the holes, the failures, in 
the SCM, thus, providing a means of methodologically categorizing the causes of 
incidents/accidents. Therefore, it serves as a practical tool for accident investigators, 
analysts, and safety professionals in real-world settings (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).     
Similar to the barriers identified in Reason‟s SCM, the structure of HFACS is 
hierarchical, categorizing nineteen causal factors into four levels of failure. The four 
levels include active and latent failures; while the first level represents the active failures, 
unsafe acts, the other three levels include the latent failures, preconditions for unsafe acts, 
unsafe supervision, and organizational influences, each dependent on the previous one as 






Figure 2.7: HFACS Framework (Shappell, 2009) 
 
2.2.5.1 HFACS Framework 
Unsafe Acts 
 
The first level of HFACS represents the unsafe acts of an operator leading to an 
incident/accident. Similar to the persons approach, this level focuses on the individual, 
putting the responsibility for the accident on the operator. These unsafe acts are classified 
into two categories: errors and violations. Errors or mistakes are actions of the operator 
that fail to carry out the desired outcomes and are extended to include three basic error 
types: skill-based, decision, and perceptual. Violations, which are the intentional neglect 
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of the established rules and regulations by the operator, are divided into two, routine and 
exceptional.  
The most common types of errors are skill-based errors (Patterson & Shappell, 
2010; Shappell et al., 2007). These physical errors occur with little or no conscious 
thought during highly automated tasks. The more familiar the task becomes to an 
individual, the more automated it becomes. For instance, a pilot examines a mechanical 
repair which has been performed recently during the walk-around. However, during this 
check, he becomes involved in the routine activities of the walk-around, totally forgetting 
to check the structural repair, hence, committing a skill-based error (Airbus, 2005). In 
general, skill-based errors are primarily due to failures of memory and/or attention, and 
often appear as forgetting or missing steps in a checklist, or misplacing a step in a 
sequence of steps. 
The second type, decision errors, describes intentional actions of an individual 
that proceed as planned but the results indicate that they are inadequate or inappropriate 
for the situation. Decision errors involve three types: knowledge-based, rule-based, and              
problem-solving (Wiegmann et al., 2005). Knowledge-based errors occur when an 
operator selects an action plan that proves to be the incorrect procedure for the situation; 
factors such as inexperience, time, and stress enhance such errors. Rule-based errors, 
often referred to as procedural decision errors, occur when a situation is either not 
recognized or is misdiagnosed, and the wrong procedure is applied (Rasmussen, 1982). In 
many situations, an individual is confronted with a problem that is not well understood or 
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for which no formal procedure exists yet requiring a novel solution. In such situations, 
the time needed to arrive at a good solution is rarely available.  
Perception errors, the third type of error, occur when the sensory input, whether 
visual, auditory, or olfactory, is degraded. These are caused by the misinterpretation of 
the input itself, not by the input being used. Therefore, there is a disparity between a 
person‟s perception of the situation and its reality. 
Violations are actions of the operator disregarding the established rules and 
regulations, are therefore, considered intentional. Violations can be routine or exceptional 
based on their etiology (Wiegmann et al., 2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Routine 
violations represent less serious departures from rules and regulations tolerated by 
authority personnel, thus becoming habitual in nature; on the other hand, exceptional 
violations are severe departures from rules and protocols that are not condoned by such 
personnel. While a pilot neglecting to use Air Traffic Control (ATC) radar advisories is 
an example of a routine violation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), flying a commercial 
airplane without the mandatory co-pilot is an example of an exceptional violation. 
Precondition for Unsafe Acts 
The second level, and the first latent tier, is the precondition for unsafe acts, 
including environmental factors, conditions of the operator, and personnel factors. 
Environmental factors are categorized into two causal factors: the physical environment 
and the technological environment. The physical environment describes both the 
operational (tools, machinery, etc.) and ambient (temperature, weather, etc.) conditions. 
Examples of physical environment causal factors include weather, housekeeping, and 
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lighting. The technological environment takes into consideration the design of equipment 
and controls, the interaction between operators and equipment and the display/interface 
characteristics, a critical issue in human error.  
The second classification of the preconditions for unsafe acts, the conditions of 
operators, is categorized into three causal factors: adverse mental state, adverse 
physiological state, and physical/mental limitations. The adverse mental state of the 
operator deals with such mental conditions as the mental fatigue, distraction, inattention, 
and complacency that can adversely affect the performance of an operator. The adverse 
physiological state of the operator covers such medical and physical conditions as 
medical illness, physiological incapacitation, and physical fatigue. The physical/mental 
limitations category refers to situations where the operators‟ long-term capabilities are 
exceeded by the demands of the job such as incompatible intelligence/aptitude and 
incompatible physical capability for safely executing an occupation. 
The last classification of the preconditions for unsafe acts tier, the personnel 
factors component, is categorized into two causal factors: communication coordination 
and planning and Fitness for Duty. Communication coordination and planning between 
personnel, management, crews and teams include such instances as the failure of an 
individual to use all available resources. The Fitness for Duty category involves off-duty 
activities that affect operator readiness to perform as proposed, including self-medication, 






The third level, unsafe supervision, deals with performances and decisions of 
supervisors and managers that can affect the performance of operators in the frontline. It 
is categorized into four categories: inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate 
operations, failure to correct a known problem, and supervisory violations category. 
 Inadequate supervision includes those times when supervision either fails to or 
provides inappropriate or improper guidance, oversight, and/or training. The planned 
inappropriate operations category involves those situations when supervisors fail to 
evaluate the risk associated with a task, thereby placing employees at an unacceptable 
level of risk; these include improper staffing, mission not in accordance with 
rules/regulations, and inadequate opportunity for crew rest. The failure to correct a 
known problem refers to those instances where unacceptable conditions of equipment, 
training or behaviors are identified, yet actions or conditions remain uncorrected, 
meaning supervisors fail to initiate corrective actions or report such unsafe situations. 
The supervisory violations category is the willful disregard of the established rules and 
regulations by those in positions of leadership. 
Organizational Influences 
The fourth level, and final latent tier, involves the organizational influences where 
deficiencies and failures can be traced to the highest levels of the organization. This tier 
is categorized into three causal factors: resource/acquisition management, organizational 
climate, and organizational process. Resource/acquisition management includes top 
management decisions related to the allocation of such resources as equipment, facilities, 
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money, and humans. The organizational climate category refers to those variables, such 
as the organizational structure, culture, and policies, which affect worker performance. 
The organizational process category refers to the decision-making that governs the day-
to-day operations of an organization, such as operations, procedures, and oversight. Often 
latent conditions within the organizational level are overlooked during accident 
investigations; however, HFACS provides a mean of considering such factors in the 
investigation and analysis process.  
2.2.5.2 Validation of HFACS 
Although research evaluating human error classification systems is limited, 
HFACS is an exception, its effectiveness having been investigated during its 
development; yet Beaubien and Baker (2002) criticized these studies because only the 
founders of HFACS conducted them. However, multiple researchers in addition to the 
developers have now researched its utility. The effectiveness of any human error 
framework is based on its validity, which refers to the extent to which a framework is 
well-grounded and corresponds accurately to the real world (Fleishman, Quaintance, & 
Broedling, 1984).   
Mainly, two types of validity are important in scientific research, external validity 
and internal validity. While external validity refers to the extent to which an instrument 
can be generalized to other contexts, internal validity represents the extent to which an 
instrument is valid within a specific setting (Fleishman, Quaintance, & Broedling, 1984). 
The most important types of internal validity that are relevant to human error frameworks 
are content validity, face validity, and construct validity (Weigmann & Shappell, 2003).  
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While content validity represents whether a given framework covers all the major 
issues within the topic, face validity answers the question: does the framework have a 
reasonable approach and common sense in the eyes of those who would use it 
(Weigmann & Shappell, 2003). Construct validity refers to the extent to which a 
particular instrument (e.g., HFACS) performs in accordance with theoretical expectations 
(Carmines & Zeller, 1979).  Construct validity is most likely the most difficult type of 
validity to verify.  
From a practical view point, face validity and content validity are related to the 
evaluation criterion usefulness and comprehensiveness, respectively as proposed by 
Kirwan (1998). In addition to usefulness and comprehensiveness, Kirwan (1998) 
suggested a broad set of evaluation criteria for human error identification techniques, 
listed in Table 2.3. Besides Kirwan (1998), few researchers have proposed objective 
criteria for establishing the validity of human error frameworks in practical settings 
(O‟Conner & Hardiman, 1996; Hollnagel, 1998). Furthermore, the founders of HFACS 
suggested that at least four criteria need to be considered when evaluating a human error 
Framework, comprehensiveness, usability, diagnosticity, and reliability (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2001b). The following sections discuss in detail the four criteria, 








Table 2. 3: Validation Criteria for Human Error Identification Techniques (Kirwan, 1998) 
Criteria Explanation 
Comprehensiveness  The ability to distinguish and classify a broad form of errors. 
 
Reliability The extent of how the framework is structured, which leads to 
consistent results between different users at a specific time 
(inter-rater reliability) and within coders (intra-rater reliability) 




Whether the framework is built on a human performance model 
with a theoretically acceptable internal structure. 
 
Contextual Validity The extent to which the framework efficiently identifies the 
circumstances of an event occurs. 
 
Flexibility The ability of the framework to include different levels of 
analysis respect to project requirements and information and 
user experience. 
 
Usefulness Whether the framework recommends, or can promote, effective 
error reduction or mitigation strategies. This incorporates the 
criterion of Diagnosticity which refers to the ability of the 
framework to arrive at the causes of the error, permitting 




The time spent to develop expertise on the framework. 
Resource Usage The total time involved to collect primary and auxiliary 
information and perform the analysis. 
 
Usability Refers to how easy it is to use the framework. 
 





2. 2.5.2.1 Comprehensiveness 
Comprehensiveness is the framework‟s ability to define and/or identify all 
significant information relating to an incident/accident. Since no statistical methods exist 
to quantify this criterion, it is investigated by mapping the human error framework onto 
an existing accident database of an organization (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), the 
framework being considered comprehensive if all causes of an incident/accident are 
incorporated in it. Initially, the comprehensiveness of HFACS was validated based on its 
application to USA civil and military aviation databases (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Subsequently, it was applied to other applications including but are not limited to mining, 
construction, railroads, oil and gas, marine, and security. These studies also found that the 
causal factors associated to accidents could be classified using the HFACS distinct causal 
categories.  
The analysis by such classification provides insights into possible tactics for 
preventing accidents. For example, the analysis of the majority of industrial accidents 
using HFACS, whether national or international, revealed that at the level of  unsafe acts 
of operators, the most prevalent category was skill-based errors, including memory lapse, 
distraction, and poor technique (e.g., aviation: Boquet, Detwiler, Hackworth, Holomb, & 
Pfleiderer, 2007; Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008; S. Shappell et al., 2007; S. A. Shappell & 
Wiegman, 2003; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997; 2001c, railroad: Baysari, McIntosh, & 
Wilson, 2008; Reinach & Viale, 2006 healthcare: ElBardissi, Wiegmann, Dearani, Daly, 
& Sundt, 2007, shipping: Celik & Cebi, 2009, mining: Lenne, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 
2012; Patterson & Shappell, 2010; Patterson, 2009). The second highest percentage in 
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this level was decision errors (e.g., aviation: Boquet, Detwiler, Hackworth, Holomb, & 
Pfleiderer, 2007; Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008; Shappell et al., 2007; Shappell & Wiegman, 
2003; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997; 2001c, railroad: Baysari, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2008; 
Reinach & Viale, 2006, mining: Lenne, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 2012; Patterson & 
Shappell, 2010; Patterson, 2009) and violations (e.g., healthcare: ElBardissi, Wiegmann, 
Dearani, Daly, & Sundt, 2007, and mining: Lenne, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 2012; 
Patterson, 2009). In contrast to the majority of other industries, the most frequent 
category was the violation category in the construction industry seen in the improper use 
of the personal protective equipment (Hale, Walker, Walters, & Bolt, 2012). 
At the second level, precondition for unsafe acts, adverse mental states have 
routinely been found to be the leading type of failures for many industries, specifically 
mental fatigue and stress (e.g., aviation: Boquet, Detwiler, Hackworth, Holomb, & 
Pfleiderer, 2007; Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008; Shappell et al., 2007; Shappell & Wiegman, 
2003; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997; 2001c, and healthcare: Portaluri et al., 2010). 
However, for the mining (Lenne, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 2012; Patterson & Shappell, 
2010; Patterson, 2009) and maritime industries (Celik & Cebi, 2009)                                                   
the highest percentage of accidents within this level is the physical and technical 
environment category, respectively, perhaps because of the harsh and continually 
changing environment of miners, and mariners. The most frequent causal factor identified 
in the cardiovascular surgery operating room was the communication and coordination 
causal code (ElBardissi, Wiegmann, Dearani, Daly, & Sundt, 2007).  
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The next two levels of HFACS are often infrequently investigated and, therefore, 
are underrepresented in most accident reports or narrative summary reports, meaning 
causal factors at the unsafe supervision and organizational tier are associated with fewer 
incident/accident cases than those at other tiers of HFACS (e.g., Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001a; Shappell et al., 2007). For the research available, the leading causal factors for 
each of these levels are inadequate supervision (e.g., Baysari, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2008; 
Gaur, 2005; Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008; Portaluri et al., 2010) and organizational processes 
(e.g., Baysari, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2008; Lenne, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 2012; Li, 
Harris, & Yu, 2008; Patterson & Shappell, 2010; Patterson, 2009; Portaluri et al., 2010). 
Aas (2008) in a study on oil and gas of the Norwegian offshore accidents found that 74% 
of the accidents examined had at least one contributing factor at the organizational level, 
15% at the supervisory level, 7% at the preconditions for unsafe acts, and 4% at the 
unsafe acts level, a distinctive finding compared to other HFACS studies in which causal 
factors at the top two levels were relatively rare (e.g., Shappell et al., 2007; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2001a). 
In addition, the comprehensiveness of HFACS as an investigative and analysis 
tool for accident causation has led to the development of the Aviation System Risk Model 
(ASRM), an analytical framework incorporating both data and expert judgments for 
projecting system risk, which evaluates the impact of technology interventions. This risk 
model, developed by Luxhoj (2003), involves three analytical approaches, HFACS, 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs), and case studies and expert opinions. The analysis 
begins with discussion of accident cases with subject matter experts. Then the causal 
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factors are identified using the HFACS taxonomy. Influence diagrams are used to model 
interactions among the HFACS causal factors identified that are reviewed by subject 
matter experts. Next, conditional probability tables are created based on the opinions of 
these subject matter experts and integrated into a Bayesian Belief Network representing 
the industry of aviation maintenance. Subsequently, the efficiency of targeted 
interventions on HFACS causal factors is obtained from experts through sensitivity 
analysis. Finally, a user interface displays the expected risk on the relative risk intensity 















Figure 2.8: ASRM User Interface, Evaluation Form (Luxhøj & Kauffeld, 2003)                                            
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In an attempt to improve the comprehensiveness of HFACS, several HFACS 
derivatives have been developed, including HFACS maintenance (Krulak, 2004), HFACS 
railway operations (Baysari, Caponecchia, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2009; Reinach & Viale, 
2006), Department of Defense HFACS (O'Connor, 2008; O'Connor, Walliser, & Philips, 
2010), HFACS air traffic control (Scarborough & Pounds, 2001), HFACS mining 
(Patterson & Shappell, 2010), and HAFCS Australian Defense Force (Olsen & Shorrock, 
2010). The structure of such derivatives is identical to the basic HFACS framework with 
slight variations appropriate for a specific industry. For instance, the HFACS Mining 
(HFACS-MI) structure is identical to the structure of HFACS except that a fifth level, 
Outside Factors, was added to account for external factors such as pressure from 
environmental groups and legal governmental influences as seen in Figure 2.9. Similarly, 
the Department of Defense HFACS (DoD- HFACS) adds a level of fine grain 
classification called nano codes, as shown below in Figure 2.10; the nano codes for 
violation category are violations based on risk assessment, violations that are 
routine/widespread, and violations due to lack of discipline. Although such derivatives 
have enhanced the comprehensiveness of HFACS for a particular industry, its 
comprehensiveness as a general accident investigation and analysis tool is maintained, 




















Figure 2.9: Human Factors Analysis and Classification System-Mining Industry (HFACS-MI) 
Framework (Patterson & Shappell, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Department of Defense - Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (DoD-
HFACS) Framework (Dept. of Defense, 2005) 
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2. 2.5.2.2 Usability 
Usability is the framework‟s ability to be applied for practical use in industry. 
Similar to comprehensiveness, the usability of HFACS was suggested by its adoption by 
organizations like the U.S. Navy/Marine and the U.S. Army as an investigative and 
analysis tool for accident causation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). Subsequently, it has 
seen successful applications in diverse industries including air traffic control (Broach & 
Dollar, 2002), civil aviation (Inglis & McRandle, 2007; Lenne, Ashby, & Fitzharris, 
2008; Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008; Shappell et al., 2007; Ting & Dai, 2011; Wiegmann et al., 
2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a), aviation maintenance (Krulak, 2004; Rashid, 
Place, & Braithwaite, 2010), mining (Lenne, Salmon, Liu, & Trotter, 2012; Patterson & 
Shappell, 2010), construction (Garrett & Teizer, 2009), railroads (Baysari, McIntosh, & 
Wilson, 2008; Baysari, Caponecchia, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2009; Reinach & Viale, 
2006), healthcare (ElBardissi, Wiegmann, Dearani, Daly, & Sundt, 2007), oil and gas  
(Aas, 2008; Wang, Faghih Roohi, Hu, & Xie, 2011), marine (Celik & Cebi, 2009; 
Schröder-Hinrichs, Baldauf, & Ghirxi, 2011), and security (Wertheim, 2010). 
2. 2.5.2.3 Diagnosticity 
Diagnosticity is the framework‟s ability to show the relationships among errors 
and their trends and causes (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2001). Although the diagnosticity 
of the HFACS framework was originally verified case-by-case using aviation datasets  
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001), Dekker (2001) questioned the extent of the connection in 
the HFACS taxonomy between human error and the operational environment as it does 
not explain why an operator committed an error, only shifting it from the front end, at the 
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operator level, to higher up the organizational chain. However, recent research has 
investigated the statistical associations between the levels and the causal categories 
within HFACS (Berry, Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2010; Li & Harris, 2006; Li, Harris, & 
Yu, 2008; Tvaryanas & Thompson, 2008). These analyses have begun to describe 
statistically how actions and decisions at higher managerial levels propagate throughout 
the organization, resulting in active errors and, thus, accidents occur.  
 For instance, Li and Harris (2006) conducted an empirical study analyzing 523 
accidents in the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force between 1978 and 2002 through the 
application of the HFACS framework. This study uses Goodman and Kruskall‟s lambda 
(λ) to find the relationships, the links, between the lower categories and the immediately 
higher level in the framework. Based on those results, the study found various error 
pathways linking all four levels of the HFACS taxonomy. For instance, poor decisions at 
the organizational level significantly affects supervisory  performance, thereby affecting 
preconditions for the unsafe acts level and, hence, indirectly affecting the performance of 
pilots at the operational level, Figure 2.9.  
In a subsequent effort, Li, Harris and Yu (2008) analyzed 41 civil aviation 
accidents in the Republic of China (ROC) between 1999 and 2006 using the HFACS 
framework. This study identified paths relating errors at the operational level to the three 
levels above it, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational 
influences as seen in Figure 2.10. Specifically, at the HFACS highest level, the 
organizational process category is associated with the inadequate supervision category at 
level 3, and the latter is associated with crew resource management category, which 
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among many other categories at the second level, is associated with the immediate causes 
of many operational errors preceding accidents. The results support Reason‟s (1990) 


























Figure 2.11: Significant Paths between Categories at the Four levels in the HFACS Framework  






Note: Solid lines indicate lambda in excess of 50%. Dashed thick lines indicate lambda in excess 
of zero. Dashed fine lines indicate Chi-Square is significant but lambda zero. Dashed rectangle 
indicates the category has no significant association with any lower level categories. 
 
In a similar study, Tvaryanas and  Thompson (2008) identified recurrent error 
pathways using the HFACS framework, analyzing 95 remote piloted aircraft (RPA) 
mishaps and safety incidents reported to the Air Force Safety Center 1997 – 2005.  An 
interesting aspect of this study is the utilization of a tree diagram that quantitatively 
assesses the associations between active and latent failures including the identification of 
error pathways. Four recurrent error pathways associated with four types of HFACS 
active failures were identified. Two of these were related to situation awareness errors 




associated with perception of the environment,  57%  of  which involved crew member 
mishaps. 
While most of the studies that investigated the associations between active errors 
and latent conditions based on HFACS framework were aviation related, Berry, 
Stringfellow and Shappell (2010) conducted a study beyond this industry. They focused 
on identifing relationships between active errors and latent conditions in seven industries 
ranging from maintenance to mining to entertainment, looking for common human error 
pathways. Using Pearson‟s Chi-square test, odds ratio and the relative risk, significant 
causal factor pairings emerged from the analysis of adjacent and non-adjacent tiers as 
seen in Figure 2.11. Fifteen causal category pairs were found to be significant, twelve in 
the adjacent tier analysis and three in the non-adjacent. For the former, four associations 
were found between the unsafe supervision and the preconditions for unsafe acts tiers and 
eight associations were found between the preconditions for unsafe acts and the unsafe 
acts tiers; this high percentage of associations between these two tiers is due to their ease 
of investigation and classification. For the latter three, two associations were found 
between the unsafe supervision and the unsafe acts tiers and one between the 
















































Note: Solid lines indicate associations with significant Chi-Square, Odds ratio, and lower relative 
risk results. Dashed lines indicate associations with significant Chi-Square and Odds ratio results. 










2. 2.5.2.4 Reliability  
In addition to the previous criteria, comprehensiveness, usability, and 
diagnosticity, it is also very important that the HFACS satisfies a specific reliability 
standard. In general, reliability refers to the extent to which a framework, experiment, test 
or measuring instrument yields the same result over repeated trials (Carmines and Zeller, 
1979). Evaluating reliability is a primary concern for many fields including the 
behavioral, psychological, medical, and social sciences, particularly as new methods, 
tests, devices, and instruments are developed. 
Basically, there are two types of reliability important in scientific research:    
inter-rater and intra-rater reliability. While inter-rater reliability refers to the framework‟s 
ability to obtain the same results irrespective to who conducts the analysis, intra-rater 
reliability refers to the consistency of each rater. It is anticipated that minor variations 
may occur in both cases; however, in general, the more stable the results, the more 
confident that the results are reproducible and trustworthy. Of the two, inter-rater 
reliability is considered the most crucial, explaining why it has received the most research 
attention.  
The inter-rater reliability assessment of the HFACS, which can be traced back to 
its development phase, was initially investigated using the military aviation accident 
database, specifically the  Marine Corps Controlled Flight into Terrain accidents (Rabbe, 
1996; Walker, 1996 as cited in Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001), Navy Tactical Aircraft 
accidents and Rotary Wing accidents (Plourde, 1997; Ranger, 1997 as cited in Shappell 
& Wiegmann, 2001), and 77 A-10 accidents (Johnson, 1997; Plourde, 1997 as cited 
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in Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001). In these studies, three raters classified several accident 
causal factors, with the inter-rater reliability being determined for every pair of raters 
using Cohen‟s Kappa . In these initial studies, Cohen‟s Kappa  ranged between 0.65 to 
0.70 in the early studies increasing to 0.93 to 0.95 in the later ones; this improvement was 
probably due to the continuous enhancement in defining the HFACS causal categories, 
indicating that a reliable framework has been developed to be used in this field.  
  Subsequently, Weigmann (2000) extended the inter-rater reliability of HFACS to 
two sets of commercial aviation accident data, the first involving 44 air carrier accidents 
and the second 79 commercial aviation accidents; again, the measure was Cohen‟s Kappa  
(K = 0.65 and K = 0.75, respectively). Expanding the sample size of this 
study, Weigmann and Shappell (2001c) conducted the largest inter-rater 
reliability assessment of HFACS to date using a dataset involving 2,500 general aviation 
accidents associated with more than 6,000 causal factors classified by five raters. This 
study showed an average Cohen‟s Kappa value of 0.72, implying a substantially reliable 
framework (Landis & Koch, 1977).  
Similar to the developers of HFACS, Li and Harris (2005) investigated the inter-
rater reliability of 523 ROC Air Force aviation accidents associated with more than 1,762 
HFACS causal factors. An instructor pilot and an aviation psychologist classified these 
factors independently and reliability was assessed using Cohen‟s Kappa  and percent 
agreement. While Cohen‟s Kappa  ranged from 0.44 to 0.83, revealing moderate to 
satisfactory agreement, percent agreement fluctuated between 72% and 96.4%, 
demonstrating acceptable inter-rater reliability without considering agreement by chance.  
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More recently, Olsen (2011) evaluated the inter-rater reliability of HFACS in the 
Australian military air traffic control (ATC) environment. Two groups of coders, three 
human factors ATC specialists and four air traffic controllers self-trained through a self-
paced workbook independently classified causal factors of 14 incident reports pre-
identified by the researcher using HFACS. The results revealed low inter-rater reliability 
for both groups; percentage agreement for both the category level and the tier level for 
each group was 36.1% for the ATCO group and 34.5% for the HF specialist group, and 
64.8% for the ATCO group and 56.4% for the HF specialist group, respectively.  
In addition, two studies have investigated the reliability of several HFACS 
derivatives, Department of Defense HFACS (DoD-HFACS) and HAFCS Australian 
Defense Force (HFACS-ADF) (O'Connor, 2008; O'Connor, Walliser, & Philips, 2010; 
Olsen & Shorrock, 2010). O‟Connor (2008) investigated the inter-rater reliability of the 
DoD-HFACS framework, by determining the within-group inter-rater reliability 
coefficient (rwg) and percent agreement of 123 coders. These coders, students at the 
Navy/Marine Corps School of Aviation Safety, identified and classified the human 
factors causes of two aviation mishap scenarios. While at the categorical level percent 
agreement ranged from 53% to 99%, fluctuating between fair to excellent inter-rater 
reliability, at the nano level percent agreement ranged from 24% to 43%, indicating 
acceptable levels of inter-rater reliability was not achieved.  
Using the same derivative, O‟Connor (2010) used multi-rater Kappa  free (Kfree) to 
evaluate the inter-rater reliability of the DoD-HFACS; in this study 22 military officers 
classified causes of an aviation incident by interviewing a U.S. Navy officer involved in 
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the incident. The results showed an average Fleiss‟ Kappa  of 0.76 at the categorical level, a 
moderate level of inter-rater reliability.  
In the second study, Olsen and Shorrock (2010) investigated the inter-rater and 
Intra-rater reliability of the HAFCS Australian Defense Force (HFACS-ADF) framework 
by calculating percent agreement. First, to investigate the inter-rater reliability, 11 air 
traffic control officers (ATCOs) from the Royal Australian Air Force with different levels 
of training and experience with HFACS-ADF classified two randomly chosen ATC 
incident reports. Percentage agreement at the category level and the nano level were 
39.9% and 19.8%, respectively, both considered unsuitable levels of inter-rater reliability. 
Second, to investigate the Intra-rater reliability, four members of the ATC classified five 
incident reports within a 4-to-20 month time period. The results showed that percent 
agreement at the category level ranged from 36.2% to 46.2% and at the nano level from 
26.7% to 43.8%. Both the inter-rater and Intra-rater reliability were very low, suggesting 
that the HFACS-ADF is unreliable.  
In addition to the limited number of studies investigating the reliability of 
HFACS, four limitations in their approaches make the comprehensive comparison across 
these studies difficult. The first limitation is the number of coders, which fluctuates from 
two to twenty-two, meaning that most of these studies used only a few raters, perhaps 
indicating sample bias. The second limitation is the level of experience of the coders, 
ranging from students to human factors specialists, a factor that might also affect the 
generalizability of such studies. Another limitation is that the majority of these studies 
used only aviation datasets, and the number of causal factors that were classified differed. 
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Moreover, only one to two types of statistical measures were used to assess the reliability 
of HFACS. Finally, the comparison of intra-rater reliability of HFACS in these studies is 
limited since only one part of one study of the seven considered Intra-rater reliability. 
As more and more industries are adopting HFACS framework as an investigation 
and analysis tool for incidents/accidents, safety professionals must be confident that the 
data are valid and reliable. The study proposed here addresses these limitations by 
evaluating both the inter-rater and intra-rater reliability of HFACS. Initially, the targeted 
number of raters is more than 80; additionally, this study attempts to ensure that the 
coders have had standardized training and similar experiences in the real-world use of 
HFACS prior to participating in this study. Moreover, to ensure comprehensiveness of 
the data used, accident causal factors will be populated from various datasets ranging 
from lodging to mining to construction. Finally, because some statistical measures are 
more appropriate for nominal data, the percent agreement, Krippendorff‟s Alpha (), 
Cohen‟s Kappa  (K), and Fleiss‟ Kappa  (KF) will be used to investigate the reliability of 
HFACS; in addition, using multiple measures is more likely to ensure a comprehensive 









CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
To investigate and evaluate the inter-rater and intra-rater reliability of the 
HFACS, this study proposed to use a within-subject design. This experimental design 
was selected because of its statistical benefit, as the number of subjects increase, 
statistical power increases. A description of the participants, the instrument, and the 
procedure, all of which have been IRB-approved through Clemson University, is 
provided in this chapter. In addition, it covers the data collection techniques and the 
statistical procedures and packages used in the study. 
 
3.1 Participants 
One hundred and twenty five safety professionals from various industries 
considering implementing the HFACS as an alternative for the current accident 
investigation and analysis system in their workplaces participated in this study. Two days 
of instruction on HFACS was provided to all participants through HFACS Inc. This 
entry-level training, designed for safety specialists engaged in the investigation and/or 
analysis of accidents, included a comprehensive description of the HFACS structure, the 
nineteen causal codes, to enable the participants to classify mishap/accident causal factors 
accurately in relation to the relevant human error level and to the appropriate HFACS 
code. The participants were recruited through a face-to-face presentation during the 
training. The study was explained to the participants, and were asked if they wished to 




The self-developed survey using a Google form found in Appendix A was used as 
the primary data-gathering instrument in this study. This survey was divided into two 
sections: the user identifier and the survey. While the user identifier was the participant‟s 
email address, which provides accurate differentiation between participants, the survey 
statements were structured using a multiple choice format. In the Google form, each of 
the 95 causal factors was formatted as a statement, followed by the 19 HFACS causal 
codes. The participants were required to read and identify each causal factor, and then 
attribute it to the causal code that best described it by checking the appropriate box.  
The self-developed survey used here to measure the reliability of HFACS 
provides a focus different from the majority of reliability studies (Olsen & Shorrock, 
2010; Wallace, Ross, Davies, Wright, & White, 2002). Frequently in these studies, the 
participants were provided with two or more incident reports needing to be coded. This 
approach not only measures the ability of a coder to code a causal factor to the right code 
but also incorporates the ability of the coder to identify the presence of a certain causal 
factor, extract it, and then classify it. As a result, reliability is tested on both selection and 
coding of events, while in this study reliability was tested on coding of events only.  
The causal factors represented by the statements on the survey were extracted 
from actual accident reports from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and other HFACS accident 
databases such as mining and lodging. For example, the causal factor statement in the 
survey, “The captain chose to continue fishing despite the severe weather predictions and 
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the exposed location of the ship Katmai,” was extracted from the NTSB accident report 
number DCA-09-CM-001:  
National Weather Service data indicated that at the time of the 
accident, winds were from the east at 60–70 knots; the air temperature was 
38 F; the water temperature was 43 F; the wave height was 20–30 feet; 
and prevailing conditions were rain with no icing. Despite severe weather 
predictions and the exposed location of the Katmai, the master chose to 
continue fishing. The master told the marine board that, at about 0200 on 
October 21, the Katmai had completed fishing operations and crew 
members had begun to store their gear in preparation for the return to 
Dutch Harbor (NTSB, 2011). 
This approach was adopted to ensure content validity of the survey statements.   
Moreover, to ensure coders will remain focused and alert, each causal code had a total of 
five causal factors randomly ordered in the Google survey, meaning 95 causal factors 
were coded by all participants. Additionally, to prevent training bias, the HFACS 
instructors were not involved in any stage of the development of the survey and did not 
have access to the Google form.    
The multiple choice format was selected as it enables the respondents to answer 
the survey easily with minimum error as opposed to a drop box or fill in the blank. In 
addition, the Google form allowed the researcher to perform the computations efficiently 
as the results of the survey were compiled automatically in a spreadsheet. To ensure the 
survey statements used for the study were clear, the researcher tested it twice using ten 
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total respondents each participating twice. The respondents‟ responses were used only for 
testing purposes and did not form part of the study. 
For this pilot study, ten graduate students in the Industrial Engineering 
Department at Clemson University were offered 2-hour refresher course on HFACS. 
Subsequently, the respondents were given the self-developed survey in which each 
HFACS causal code involved a total of six causal factors, meaning the respondents coded 
114 causal factors. Further, during this first round, the researcher asked the respondents 
to record any statement number that caused confusion and at what point, if any, they 
experienced fatigue. The researcher revised any survey statement having a difficulty 
index above 60% and if 40% or more found it ambiguous. A difficulty index is the 
percentage of students who submitted an incorrect answer. The researcher modified the 
vague and compound causal factor statments into simpler ones to guarantee 
comprehension. 
For the second round of the pilot study, the researcher reduced the number of 
survey statements to 95 from the original 114 since the majority of the respondents 
indicated fatigue at approximately statement number 100. The same ten respondents and 
testing criteria were used as in round one. In addition, to ensure the suitability of the 
survey statements for the study, item analysis was performed on the survey statements 




The majority of the 125 participants participated in two experimental sessions, the 
first immediately at the end the HFACS training and the second two weeks from the first 
session. The first session did not exceed an hour and a half and was conducted in the 
location where the training took place; all participants were required to bring their 
personal computers. For the second session, conducted 2-weeks later, the participants 
completed the reliability trial at their convenience, submitting the survey within a 72-
hour window.  
For the first session, the initial five minutes were devoted to clarifying the 
instructions and distributing the consent form (Appendix B). Oral and written instructions 
emphasized that the participants are to work individually. While the participants started 
their personal computers and signed in to their email, the researcher emailed a link of the 
Google form to each of them. Once the Google form has been accessed, the participants 
(i.e., the coders) read and classified each causal factor into the causal code which was the 
best description. Upon completion of the coding of all the causal factors, the participants 
submitted the Google form. The participants‟ responses along with their unique user IDs 
were combined into a spreadsheet having the same name as the Google form. When the 
session was over, the researcher deleted the Google form to prevent further participant 






3.4 Data Management and Statistical Analysis 
The data obtained from the classification of each survey statement into the 
HFACS causal code by all participants was not in appropriate form for the analyses of 
evaluating the intra-rater and inter-rater reliability of HFACS. The raw data obtained 
from the two sessions were converted into numerical notations using an Microsoft Excel 
macro. For example, a skill-based error was converted to a 1 and a decision error to a 2; 
Appendix C provides the lists of the 19 HFACS categories and their numerical notations 
for each HFACS tier and category level, respectively. 
Reliability of HFACS is established by demonstrating agreement among coders. 
Many agreement measures have been proposed; for example, for nominal data Popping 
(1988) listed 43 measures. In addition, the lack of consensus among statisticians and 
researchers on which measures are appropriate further increases the complexity of the 
decision on which to use. This study used four measures to analyze the data for this 
study: percent agreement (PA), Krippendorff‟s Alpha (), Cohen‟s Kappa (K), and 
Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF). The percent agreement and Krippendorff‟s Alpha () were used to 
assess both the intra-rater and inter-rater reliability of HFACS. Cohen‟s Kappa was used 
to evaluate the intra-rater reliability of HFACS and Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF) was used to assess 
the inter-rater reliability. Table 3.1 summarizes the agreement measures used in this study 
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To verify the reliability of HFACS, the following are defined: 
 The set of items (i) that are coded,  i = 1, 2, 3,..., I;   
 The set of categories (C) into which the items are coded, c = 1, 2, 3,..., C;  and  
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 The set of coders (R) who designate for each item a distinctive category, r = 1, 
2, 3,..., R.  
For this study, I represents the survey statements (I=95), C the HFACS codes (C=19 at 
the category level, C=4 at the tier level), and R the number of participants or coders 
(R=125 for inter-rater, R=59 for intra-rater). Additional notations used in this study are 
listed in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: List of Notations  
Notation Definition 
Ao Observed agreement  
Do Observed disagreement 
PA Percent agreement 
p Pair of coders 
De Expected disagreement 
Po Proportion of observed agreement  
Pe Proportion of expected agreement 
N Total number of items to be classified 
nic Number of coders who assigned item i to category c 
Nrc Number of items assigned by coder r to category c 
nc Total number of items assigned by all coders to category c 
 
The first measure used to assess the inter-rater and intra-rater reliability of 
HFACS was percent agreement (PA). Scott (1955) defines percent agreement as the 
percentage of instances on which two independent coders agree when coding the same 
data. For example, for a pair of coders who code all items, I, percent agreement is 
computed as follows  
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                                         PA = 
∑    
 
   
 
 *100,                                                                      (1) 
where  
Aoi = {
                                                        




For inter-rater reliability, the total number of pairs, P, depends on the number of 
coders who participated in each session, where R=125 for the first session and R = 59 for 
the second, which was calculated using the formula P= R*(R – 1)/2. Percent agreement 
was determined for each pair of coders, meaning that the response of each coder was 
paired with another coder‟s response and PA was determined using Equation 1; then an 
overall average percent agreement was determined for all pair of coders using a 
Microsoft Excel macro. The overall average percent agreement for inter-rater was 
calculated using the following formula: 
 
 overall average PA(inter-rater) = 
∑    
 
   
      –      
*100.                              (2)        
For intra-rater reliability, p represents a specific coder‟s response from the first 
session compared to his response for the second; PA was again determined using 
Equation 1. Thus, the total number of pairs equals the number of coders who participated 
in both reliability sessions, (P=R=59). The overall average intra-rater percent agreement 
was calculated using the following formula: 
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overall average PA(intra-rater) = 
∑    
 
   
 
*100.                                 (3) 
 
In addition, the intra-rater reliability for each tier and category using percent 
agreement was determined. The observed agreement of a coder‟s response from the first 
session to the second with respect to each category (or tier), c, is 
 
Aoi(c) = {
                                                                       
                                                                      
}  
 
Also, the number of items assigned by coder, r, to a specific category (or tier), c, in the 
first session, NrcFS, was determined. The percent agreement for each coder, r, for each 
category (or tier), c, was calculated using 
PA r (c) = 
∑       
 
   
     
*100.                                                           (4) 
 
 
Subsequently, an overall average percent agreement for each category (or tier), c, was 
determined using 
 
      overall average PA (c) = 
∑       
 
   
 
 .                                          (5) 
 
                                     
For this research, percent agreement was also used to detect rogue coders that 
may have an impact on the inter-rater reliability results. Given the large sample size of 
the percent agreement values of all coders who participated in each session (P=7750 for 
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first session, P=1711 for second session), rogue coders were identified using the 
empirical rule, which states that in a symmetric distribution, approximately 95% of 
observations lie within 2 standard deviations of the mean: percent agreement percent agreement2*x s  
(Wilcox, 2010). For example, in the first session every coder was paired with the other 
124, and percent agreement for the 7750 pairs, the PA sample mean, and the PA sample 
standard deviation were determined along with the 95% cutoff values based on the 
empirical rule. For each coder, all PA values were compared with the lower limit of the 
95% cutoff. The fraction of times the PA value was less than the lower limit of the 95% 
cutoff out of the 125 was determined. A coder with at least 22% of PA values below the 
cutoff was considered rogue; this procedure was implemented using a Microsoft Excel 
macro. The analysis of the data obtained for this study was conducted with and without 
rogue coders for each session. 
Because percent agreement is easily calculated, this method has seen wide-spread 
use; however, most researchers do not rely on it solely as it does not take into 
consideration that a proportion of coder agreement may be due to chance. For example, 
rater X may use one set of guidelines to distinguish between the presence or absence of 
the physical environment as a cause and a second rater Y, using a different set of 
guidelines, may arrive at the same conclusion. In addition, coders might simply agree just 
by guessing. Such observed agreements may be explained by chance; for this reason 
Krippendorff‟s Alpha (), Cohen‟s Kappa (K), and Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF) were also used in 
this study.  
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  Krippendorff‟s Alpha, widely considered to be a robust and versatile reliability 
coefficient, was also used in assessing the inter-rater and intra-rater reliability of HFACS. 
Krippendorff‟s Alpha can be applied to large and small sample sizes, any number of 
coders, and any number of categories, while adjusting to various types of measurement 
(e.g., nominal, ordinal, or ratio). More importantly, this measure can compensate for 
missing data and yet, its results are considered viable and accurate (Krippendorff, 2012).  
The computation of Krippendorff‟s Alpha depends on the observed coincidence 
matrix in which the number of values that participate in pair comparisons are tabulated. 




the columns are the set of categories (C) into which the items are coded, c = 1, 2, 3,..., C 
and the rows, which are identified as (Q), are also the set of categories (Q=C);     
represents the number of observed coincidences for the two values q and c when, for 
example xcq is the number of times a particular coder uses q while the second uses c, the 
number of coincidences oqc = xqc + xcq. Thus, the coincidence matrix is symmetrical 
around the diagonal, oqc = ocq, and the margins of the coincidence matrices enumerate the 
values used by all coders (Krippendorff, 2006). In contrast, agreement tables tabulate the 
 1 . c . C  
1     .     .         
. . . . . . . 
q     .     .        = ∑    
 
    
. . . . . . . 
Q=C . . . . . . 
     .     . . n.. = ∑    
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numbers of units being coded, and thus are not symmetrical around the diagonal and the 
summation of the margins of the agreement table are equal to the number of items being 
coded.   
Krippendorff‟s Alpha is computed as 
                                                   =   
  
  
 ,                                                                              (6) 
 
where the observed disagreement (  ) and the expected disagreement (  ) are 
represented as 
                              = 
 
   
 ∑ ∑                 
  
   
 
                                                               (7)                
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 ∑ ∑                    
  
   
 











   (Krippendorff, 2007). 
Two reliability scale values are identified with Krippendorff‟s Alpha, with   =   
representing perfect reliability and   =   representing the absence of reliability, thereby 
denoting that the categories are statistically unrelated to the items they describe. While a 
Krippendorff‟s alpha value of 0.8 and above is considered reliable, a value between 0.667 
and 0.8, although not deemed reliable, can be used to draw tentative conclusions 
(Krippendorff, 2006).  Krippendorff's Alpha ( ) was computed to determine the inter-
rater reliability in this research using the KALPHA macro in SAS v. 9.2. An advantage of 
using this macro is that it computes the distribution of Krippendorff‟s Alpha through 
bootstrapping, thus providing two additional measures: a confidence interval for Alpha at 
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a defined level of statistical significance and a probability that Alpha could be less than a 
chosen minimum required for data to be deemed sufficiently reliable (Hayes & 
Krippendorff, 2007).  
In addition, to determine the inter-rater reliability for a single category or tier, the 
overall coincidence matrix for all items from the KALPHA macro output was also used 
in this study. The Alpha agreement for a single category (or tier), c, was determined by   
                                                                             
 
   
 (Krippendorff, 2013).                                 (9) 
 
 
Similarly, the intra-rater reliability for each tier and category using Krippendorff‟s 
Alpha was determined for each coder who participated in the two sessions (R=59). For 
each coder, an overall Krippendorff‟s Alpha and coincidence matrix including the data 
from the first session and the second session were determined for all items, I, generating 
R = 59 Krippendorff‟s Alpha values and coincidence matrices. Additionally, using 
Equation 9, a Krippendorff‟s Alpha for each category and tier, c, was determined for each 
coder which included the data from the first session and the second session, generating R 
= 59 Krippendorff‟s Alpha values for each C=4 tiers and C=19 categories. Then, an 



























         Overall Average Krippendorff‟s Alpha (c) = 
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HFACS intra-rater reliability was also assessed by Cohen‟s Kappa (K). This 
measure, which is regarded as the most widely used reliability coefficient (Kolbe & 
Burnett, 1991; Vach, 2005; Zwick, 1988), estimates the degree of agreement between two 
coders across different categories after adjusting for the agreement that could be 
attributed to chance alone.  The computation of Cohen‟s Kappa is based upon the values 
of the marginal distributions (MD) of the coders (i.e., a distribution for the categorical 
variables indicating the total frequency of each outcome) thus, it is known to be marginal 
or prevalence dependent (Nelson & Pepe, 2000).   
Cohen‟s Kappa employs square cross-classifications of the judgments of two 
coders' known as agreement tables. For example, Table 3.3 illustrates an agreement table 
for two coders A and B who code a specific set of items, i= 1, 2,3,…, I, to c = 1, 2, 3,..., 
C categories. The frequencies (m) in the agreement table in Table 3.3 give the number of 
instances in which both coders A and B identified a particular category. For instance, m1c 
is the number of instances coder A used category 1 and coder B used Category c. The 
cells, along the diagonal, display the number of incidences in which the two coders used 







Table 3.3: Agreement Table of Two Coders                 
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Based on this agreement table, Cohen‟s Kappa (K) is computed by      
                                      
                                                     K = 
     
    
 ,                                                                   (11) 
 
 
where the proportion of expected agreement (  ) and the proportion of observed 
agreement (Po)  are represented as 
 
                                             = ∑    
 
                                                                       (12) 
 
and 
                                             = 
 
 
 ∑   
 
                                                                      (13) 
 
where     and     are the marginal probabilities – the probability of a specific category, 
c, regardless of the values of the other categories – for coders A and B, respectively. 
While Po - Pe is the actual amount of agreement beyond chance, 1- Pe is the largest 
possible discrepancy between Po and Pe. Cohen‟s Kappa (K) was computed in this research 
using the FREQ procedure in SAS v. 9.2.  
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Kappa can range from -1 to 1, with K = 0 representing agreement at the chance 
level, K =1 representing perfect agreement beyond chance, and a negative value, 
agreement less than chance. Landis and Koch (1977) recommended guidelines for 
interpreting values of both Cohen‟s and Fleiss‟ Kappa (Table 3.4). Although these 
guidelines have been recommended by a number of sources (Agresti, 2007; Stokes, 
Davis, & Koch, 2000), there are limited studies supporting their accuracy. Fleiss (1981) 
suggested a similar interpretation of Kappa: a Kappa value less than 0.40 indicating poor 
agreement, a Kappa value between 0.40 and 0.75 good agreement, and a Kappa value 
above 0.75 excellent agreement. 
 
  Table 3.4: Kappa Interpretations (Landis & Koch, 1977)                                                           
K Interpretation 
< 0 Poor agreement 
(0.00 – 0.20] Slight agreement 
(0.20 – 0.40] Fair agreement 
(0.40 – 0.60] Moderate agreement 
(0.60 – 0.80] Substantial agreement 
(0.80 – 1.00] Almost perfect agreement 
 
While Cohen‟s Kappa is widely used, its results are criticized for yielding what is 
known as the Kappa paradox (Nelson & Pepe, 2000; A. von Eye & von Eye, 2008; 
Warrens, 2010). Two such paradoxes have been identified in the literature: the first, high 
levels of observed agreement may yield low Kappa values, a result dependent on the 
characteristics of the sample being coded. The second, more probable paradox is that for 
a fixed observed agreement, Kappa can have different values depending on the symmetry 
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of observations in the disagreement categories (Warrens, 2010).  However, Vach (2005) 
emphasizes that the second paradox is not a serious disadvantage for this measure, 
provided that the results are carefully analyzed and interpreted.  
HFACS inter-rater reliability was also assessed using Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF), which 
measures the degree of agreement for more than 2 coders beyond that which would be 
expected by chance using pairwise agreement.  As a result, the agreement for a specific 
item is defined as the proportion of coded pairs agreeing of the total number of coded 
pairs for that item (Fleiss, 1981).  
Although, Equation 11 used to compute Cohen‟s Kappa is also used to determine 
Fleiss‟ Kappa, the corresponding agreement table (Table 3.3) is not suitable for 
displaying the data for Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF). In general, the classification of multiple 
coders for Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF) is displayed in a table similar to Table 3.5, which shows the 
classification of 5 coders classifying I items into 4 categories. However, to determine this 
agreement coefficient, this table is reordered to create Table 3.6 emphasizing the items, I 
and categories C rather than the coders.  
 
Table 3.5: Classification of Multiple Coders 
Item 
Coders R=5 
Coder1 Coder2 Coder3 Coder4 Coder5 
1 2 2 3 2 4 
2 1 1 1 1 1 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
I-1 2 3 3 3 2 








c=1 2 3 C=4 
1 0 3 1 1 5 
2 5 0 0 0 5 
i . nic n33 . 5 
. . . . . 5 
. . . . . 5 
I-1 0 2 3 0 5 
I c c c c 5 
Total nc n2 n3 nC  
 
 
In addition, the proportion of observed agreement (Po) and the proportion of 
expected agreement (  ) from Equation 11, which are determined differently from 
Cohen‟s Kappa, are defined for Fleiss‟ Kappa as follows: 
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where, nic represents the number of coders who assigned item i to category c and nc the 




Fleiss‟ Kappa can range from 0 to 1, with KF = 0 representing agreement not 
better than chance, and KF =1 representing perfect agreement beyond chance.  The 
guidelines used for interpreting values of Cohen‟s Kappa (Table 3.3) are also 
recommended for interpreting values of Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF). Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF) for this 
research was computed using the MAGREE macro in SAS v. 9.2. 
Since to date there is no universally accepted method for measuring the reliability 
of safety taxonomies, the four methods -- percent agreement, Krippendorff‟s Alpha (), 
Cohen‟s Kappa (K), and Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF) -- used in this study provide a thorough 
analysis of the reliability of HFACS. Moreover, the approach for measuring the reliability 
of HFACS with the corresponding training described here provides an efficient way of 
measuring its reliability without involving the variable of experience in extracting causal 












CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Data from 125 participants who coded 95 causal factors into HFACS causal 
categories were collected in the first reliability session, while 59 participated in both 
reliability sessions. Although the Google survey was tested twice to ensure the exclusion 
of compound causal factors, 3 such causal factors among the 95 were identified: 
 24 – The two monorail trains were identical, which caused confusion to the 
operator. 
  92 – The electrical operator got distracted by an external noise and forgot to 
take readings on the main transformer.  
  93 – The warehouse forklift driver was suffering from a severe head cold, 
took OTC drugs, became groggy and dropped a load of boxes.  
The analyses reported here were conducted both with and without these 3 compound 
causal factors.  
The four agreement measures -- percent agreement (PA), Krippendorff‟s Alpha 
(), Cohen‟s Kappa (K), and Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF) -- were computed to analyze the data for 
this study. First, percent agreement, Cohen‟s Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha were used 
to evaluate the individual intra-rater reliability of HFACS, with percent agreement, and 
Krippendorff‟s Alpha being used to evaluate the overall intra-rater reliability of each 
HFACS tier and causal category level. Second, the overall inter-rater reliability of 
HFACS was assessed using percent agreement, Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF), and Krippendorff‟s 
Alpha (), and the overall inter-rater reliability of each HFACS tier and causal category 
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were assessed using Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF), and Krippendorff‟s Alpha (). The guidelines 
for these four agreement measures are included in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Table Key  
Font 
Percent Agreement Cohen’s / Fliess’ Kappa Krippendorff’s Alpha 
Value Conclusion Value Conclusion Value Conclusion 
Regular 


















[0.667 - 0.8) 
Tentative 
Reliability 





(0, 0.667) Unreliable 
 
4.1 Intra-rater Reliability Analysis  
Percent agreement, Cohen‟s Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha were determined 
individually for each of the 59 participants who participated in both sessions using      
SAS v. 9.3 statistical software and Microsoft Excel macros. The intra-rater agreement 
results of these measures are tabulated in Table 4.2 and 4.3 for each participant at the 
HFACS tier level with and without the 3 compound causal factors, respectively, and in 
Table 4.4 and 4.5 for each participant at the HFACS causal category level with and 
without the 3 compound causal factors, respectively. Comparing the results of the 
agreement measures with and without the 3 compound causal factors (I = 92) – Table 4.2 
with Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 with Table 4.5 – indicated no substantial differences 





Table 4.2: Intra-rater; Tier Level; PA, K, and ; Individual Coders and Overall; Whole 
Data Set 
Coder PA K 
95% CI for 
K 
α 95% CI for α 
1 88.42 0.83 (0.74, 0.93) 0.83 (0.73, 0.92) 
2 94.74 0.93 (0.87, 0.99) 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 
3 88.42 0.84 (0.75, 0.93) 0.84 (0.76, 0.92) 
4 85.26 0.79 (0.7, 0.89) 0.80 (0.69, 0.88) 
5 83.16 0.77 (0.67, 0.67) 0.77 (0.66, 0.87) 
6 86.32 0.81 (0.72, 0.91) 0.82 (0.72, 0.91) 
7 95.79 0.94 (0.89, 1.0) 0.94 (0.89, 0.99) 
8 76.84 0.68 (0.57, 0.80) 0.68 (0.55, 0.80) 
9 92.63 0.90 (0.83, 0.97) 0.90 (0.81, 0.97) 
10 94.74 0.93 (0.87, 0.99) 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 
11 89.47 0.85 (0.77, 0.94) 0.85 (0.75, 0.93) 
12 86.32 0.81 (0.72, 0.91) 0.81 (0.71, 0.90) 
13 86.32 0.81 (0.72, 0.91) 0.81 (0.71, 0.90) 
14 86.32 0.81 (0.72, 0.91) 0.81 (0.71, 0.91) 
15 90.53 0.87 (0.79, 0.95) 0.87 (0.79, 0.94) 
16 100 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 
17 87.37 0.83 (0.74, 0.92) 0.83 (0.74, 0.91) 
18 86.32 0.81 (0.71, 0.9) 0.81 (0.72, 0.90) 
19 98.95 0.99 (0.96, 1) 0.99 (0.96, 1) 
20 90.53 0.87 (0.79, 0.95) 0.87 (0.78, 0.94) 
21 91.58 0.89 (0.81, 0.96) 0.89 (0.80, 0.96) 
22 85.26 0.8 (0.70, 0.89) 0.80 (0.70, 0.90) 
23 82.11 0.76 (0.66, 0.86) 0.76 (0.65, 0.86) 
24 90.53 0.87 (0.79, 0.95) 0.87 (0.78, 0.94) 
25 88.42 0.84 (0.75, 0.93) 0.84 (0.75, 0.93) 
26 94.74 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 0.93 (0.87, 0.99) 
27 80.0 0.72 (0.61, 0.83) 0.72 (0.61, 0.84) 
28 97.89 0.97 (0.93, 1) 0.97 (0.93, 1) 
29 95.79 0.94 (0.89, 1) 0.94 (0.88, 0.99) 
30 91.58 0.88 (0.81, 0.96) 0.88 (0.80, 0.96) 
31 88.42 0.84 (0.75, 0.93) 0.84 (0.75, 0.93) 
32 97.89 0.97 (0.93, 1) 0.97 (0.93, 1) 
33 87.37 0.82 (0.73, 0.92) 0.83 (0.74, 0.91) 
34 94.74 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 0.93 (0.85, 0.99) 
35 91.58 0.88 (0.80, 0.96) 0.88 (0.80, 0.96) 
71 
 
36 97.89 0.97 (0.93, 1) 0.97 (0.93, 1) 
37 94.74 0.93 (0.87, 0.99) 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 
38 94.74 0.93 (0.87, 0.99) 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 
39 86.32 0.81 (0.72, 0.90) 0.81 (0.71, 0.90) 
40 86.32 0.81 (0.72, 0.90) 0.81 (0.70, 0.90) 
41 98.95 0.99 (0.96, 1) 0.99 (0.96, 1) 
42 93.68 0.91 (0.85, 0.98) 0.91 (0.84, 0.97) 
43 89.47 0.85 (0.77, 0.94) 0.85 (0.77, 0.93) 
44 85.26 0.8 (0.71, 0.9) 0.8 (0.70, 0.90) 
45 83.16 0.77 (0.67, 0.87) 0.77 (0.66, 0.87) 
46 92.63 0.90 (0.83, 0.97) 0.90 (0.81, 0.96) 
47 92.63 0.90 (0.83, 0.97) 0.90 (0.83, 0.97) 
48 95.79 0.94 (0.89, 1) 0.94 (0.88, 0.99) 
49 87.37 0.83 (0.73, 0.92) 0.83 (0.73, 0.91) 
50 93.68 0.91 (0.85, 0.98) 0.91 (0.84, 0.97) 
51 92.63 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 0.90 (0.83, 0.96) 
52 84.21 0.78 (0.68, 0.88) 0.78 (0.68, 0.88) 
53 82.11 0.76 (0.66, 0.86) 0.76 (0.65, 0.86) 
54 88.42 0.84 (0.75, 0.93) 0.84 (0.75, 0.93) 
55 91.58 0.88 (0.81, 0.96) 0.89 (0.8, 0.96) 
56 89.47 0.86 (0.77, 0.94) 0.86 (0.77, 0.94) 
57 98.95 0.99 (0.96, 1) 0.99 (0.96, 1) 
58 84.21 0.78 (0.68, 0.88) 0.78 (0.68, 0.87) 
59 92.63 0.90 (0.83, 0.97) 0.90 (0.83, 0.97) 










Table 4.3: Intra-rater; Tier Level; PA, K, and ; Individual Coders and Overall; 
Excluding Compound Causal Factors  
Coder PA K 
95% CI for 
K 
α 95% CI for α 
1 85.26 0.83 (0.74, 0.92) 0.83 (0.74, 0.92) 
2 91.58 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 
3 85.26 0.84 (0.75, 0.93) 0.84 (0.76, 0.93) 
4 83.16 0.80 (0.71, 0.90) 0.80 (0.70, 0.89) 
5 81.05 0.78 (0.67, 0.87) 0.78 (0.66, 0.87) 
6 84.21 0.82 (0.73, 0.92) 0.82 (0.74, 0.91) 
7 92.63 0.94 (0.88, 1) 0.94 (0.88, 0.99) 
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8 75.79 0.70 (0.59, 0.81) 0.70 (0.59, 0.82) 
9 89.47 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 
10 91.58 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 0.93 (0.85, 0.99) 
11 87.37 0.86 (0.78, 0.95) 0.87 (0.76, 0.94) 
12 84.21 0.82 (0.73, 0.92) 0.82 (0.72, 0.91) 
13 85.26 0.84 (0.74, 0.93) 0.84 (0.75, 0.93) 
14 84.21 0.82 (0.73, 0.92) 0.82 (0.74, 0.91) 
15 87.37 0.87 (0.78, 0.95) 0.87 (0.78, 0.94) 
16 96.84 1 (1 ,1) 1 (1 ,1) 
17 84.21 0.83 (0.73, 0.92) 0.82 (0.72, 0.91) 
18 84.21 0.82 (0.72, 0.91) 0.81 (0.71, 0.91) 
19 95.79 0.99 (0.96, 1) 0.99 (0.96, 1) 
20 87.37 0.87 (0.78, 0.95) 0.87 (0.78, 0.94) 
21 89.47 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 0.90 (0.81, 0.97) 
22 83.16 0.81 (0.71, 0.90) 0.81 (0.70, 0.90) 
23 78.95 0.75 (0.65, 0.86) 0.76 (0.65, 0.86) 
24 87.37 0.86 (0.78, 0.95) 0.87 (0.78, 0.94) 
25 87.37 0.87 (0.78 , 0.95) 0.87 (0.78, 0.94) 
26 92.63 0.94 (0.88, 1) 0.94 (0.88, 0.99) 
27 76.84 0.71 (0.60, 0.83) 0.72 (0.60, 0.82) 
28 94.74 0.97 (0.93, 1) 0.97 (0.93, 1) 
29 92.63 0.94 (0.88, 1) 0.94 (0.88, 0.99) 
30 89.47 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 0.90 (0.81, 0.97) 
31 85.26 0.83 (0.74, 0.93) 0.83 (0.73, 0.92) 
32 94.74 0.97 (0.93, 1) 0.97 (0.93, 1) 
33 84.21 0.82 (0.73, 0.92) 0.82 (0.72, 0.91) 
34 92.63 0.94 (0.88, 1) 0.94 (0.86, 0.98) 
35 89.47 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 
36 94.74 0.97 (0.93, 1) 0.97 (0.93, 1) 
37 91.58 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 0.93 (0.85, 0.99) 
38 92.63 0.94 (0.88, 1) 0.94 (0.88, 0.99) 
39 83.16 0.81 (0.71, 0.90) 0.81 (0.70, 0.90) 
40 83.16 0.81 (0.71, 0.90) 0.81 (0.71, 0.90) 
41 95.79 0.99 (0.96, 1) 0.99 (0.96, 1) 
42 91.58 0.93 (0.86, 0.99) 0.93 (0.85, 0.97) 
43 86.32 0.85 (0.76, 0.94) 0.85 (0.74, 0.94) 
44 83.16 0.81 (0.72, 0.91) 0.81 (0.71, 0.90) 
45 80 0.76 (0.66, 0.87) 0.76 (0.66, 0.87) 
46 90.53 0.91 (0.84, 0.98) 0.91 (0.83, 0.97) 
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47 90.53 0.91 (0.84, 0.98) 0.91 (0.84, 0.97) 
48 92.63 0.94 (0.88, 1) 0.94 (0.88, 0.99) 
49 84.21 0.82 (0.73, 0.91) 0.82 (0.71, 0.91) 
50 90.53 0.91 (0.84, 0.98) 0.91 (0.84, 0.97) 
51 89.47 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 
52 82.11 0.79 (0.69, 0.89) 0.79 (0.69, 0.88) 
53 80 0.77 (0.66, 0.87) 0.77 (0.66, 0.87) 
54 86.32 0.85 (0.76, 0.94) 0.85 (0.76, 0.93) 
55 89.47 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 
56 87.37 0.87 (0.78, 0.95) 0.87 (0.78, 0.94) 
57 95.79 0.99 (0.96, 1) 0.99 (0.96, 1) 
58 82.11 0.79 (0.69, 0.89) 0.79 (0.68, 0.89) 
59 89.47 0.90 (0.82, 0.97) 0.90 (0.82, 0.96) 










Table 4.4: Intra-rater; Category Level; PA, K, and ; Individual Coders and Overall; 
Whole Data Set  
Coder PA K 
95% CI for 
K 
α 95% CI for α 
1 68.42 0.66 (0.56, 0.76) 0.66 (0.56, 0.75) 
2 91.58 0.91 (0.87, 0.99) 0.91 (0.84, 0.96) 
3 68.42 0.66 (0.57, 0.76) 0.67 (0.56, 0.76) 
4 67.37 0.65 (0.55, 0.75) 0.65 (0.55, 0.75) 
5 64.21 0.57 (0.47, 0.68) 0.62 (0.52, 0.72) 
6 71.58 0.70 (0.60, 0.79) 0.67 (0.60, 0.80) 
7 89.47 0.89 (0.82, 0.95) 0.89 (0.82, 0.96) 
8 56.84 0.54 (0.44, 0.65) 0.54 (0.43, 0.66) 
9 84.21 0.83 (0.76, 0.91) 0.83 (0.76, 0.91) 
10 83.16 0.82 (0.74, 0.90) 0.82 (0.75, 0.90) 
11 84.21 0.83 (0.76, 0.91) 0.83 (0.75, 0.91) 
12 75.79 0.74 (0.65, 0.83) 0.74 (0.64, 0.83) 
13 74.74 0.73 (0.64, 0.83) 0.73 (0.63, 0.82) 
14 68.42 0.67 (0.57, 0.76) 0.67 (0.56, 0.76) 
15 70.53 0.69 (0.59, 0.78) 0.69 (0.58, 0.79) 
16 98.95 0.99 (0.97, 1) 0.99 (0.97, 1) 
17 71.58 0.70 (0.60, 0.79) 0.70 (0.61, 0.80) 
18 70.53 0.69 (0.59, 0.78) 0.69 (0.59, 0.78) 
74 
 
19 89.47 0.89 (0.82, 0.95) 0.89 (0.82, 0.94) 
20 75.79 0.74 (0.65, 0.83) 0.74 (0.66, 0.83) 
21 83.16 0.82 (0.74, 0.90) 0.82 (0.73, 0.90) 
22 72.63 0.71 (0.62, 0.80) 0.71 (0.60, 0.81) 
23 64.21 0.62 (0.52, 0.72) 0.62 (0.52, 0.72) 
24 80 0.79 (0.70, 0.87) 0.79 (0.70, 0.88) 
25 78.95 0.78 (0.69, 0.86) 0.78 (0.68, 0.86) 
26 86.32 0.86 (0.78, 0.93) 0.86 (0.78, 0.92) 
27 70.53 0.69 (0.59, 0.78) 0.69 (0.6, 0.79) 
28 94.74 0.94 (0.90, 0.99) 0.94 (0.89, 0.99) 
29 84.21 0.833 (0.76, 0.91) 0.83 (0.75, 0.90) 
30 76.84 0.75 (0.66, 0.84) 0.76 (0.67, 0.84) 
31 78.95 0.78 (0.69, 0.86) 0.79 (0.69, 0.87) 
32 90.53 0.90 (0.84, 0.96) 0.90 (0.83, 0.96) 
33 76.84 0.75 (0.66, 0.84) 0.76 (0.67, 0.83) 
34 83.16 0.82 (0.74, 0.90) 0.82 (0.74, 0.90) 
35 76.84 0.75 (0.66, 0.84) 0.76 (0.67, 0.84) 
36 93.68 0.93 (0.88, 0.98) 0.93 (0.88, 0.98) 
37 84.21 0.83 (0.76, 0.91) 0.83 (0.75, 0.90) 
38 85.26 0.84 (0.77, 0.92) 0.85 (0.77, 0.92) 
39 75.79 0.74 (0.65, 0.83) 0.75 (0.66, 0.83) 
40 75.79 0.74 (0.65, 0.83) 0.74 (0.64, 0.84) 
41 92.63 0.92 (0.87, 0.98) 0.92 (0.87, 0.97) 
42 64.21 0.62 (0.52, 0.72) 0.62 (0.52, 0.73) 
43 77.89 0.75 (0.66, 0.84) 0.76 (0.67, 0.83) 
44 68.42 0.67 (0.66, 0.77) 0.67 (0.57, 0.77) 
45 68.42 0.66 (0.57, 0.76) 0.67 (0.57, 0.77) 
46 83.16 0.82 (0.74, 0.90) 0.82 (0.75, 0.90) 
47 87.37 0.87 (0.80, 0.94) 0.87 (0.79, 0.93) 
48 86.32 0.86 (0.78, 0.93) 0.86 (0.78, 0.92) 
49 70.53 0.69 (0.59, 0.78) 0.69 (0.59, 0.78) 
50 80 0.79 (0.70, 0.87) 0.79 (0.70, 0.88) 
51 72.63 0.71 (0.62, 0.81) 0.71 (0.61, 0.80) 
52 68.42 0.67 (0.57, 0.76) 0.67 (0.57, 0.77) 
53 70.53 0.69 (0.59, 0.78) 0.69 (0.59, 0.78) 
54 82.11 0.81 (0.73, 0.89) 0.81 (0.72, 0.89) 
55 77.89 0.77 (0.68, 0.85) 0.77 (0.68, 0.86) 
56 73.68 0.72 (0.63, 0.81) 0.72 (0.63, 0.81) 
57 97.89 0.98 (0.95, 1) 0.98 (0.94, 1) 
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58 71.58 0.7 (0.60, 0.79) 0.70 (0.59, 0.79) 
59 77.89 0.77 (0.68, 0.85) 0.77 (0.68, 0.86) 










Table 4.5: Intra-rater; Tier Category; PA, K, and ; Individual Coders and Overall; 
Excluding Compound Causal Factors  
Coder PA K 
95% CI for 
K 
α 95% CI for α 
1 68.48 0.66 (0.56, 0.76) 0.67 (0.56, 0.75) 
2 91.3 0.91 (0.85, 0.97) 0.91 (0.84, 0.97) 
3 67.39 0.65 (0.55, 0.76) 0.66 (0.54, 0.75) 
4 67.39 0.65 (0.55, 0.75) 0.65 (0.55, 0.76) 
5 65.22 0.58 (0.48, 0.69) 0.63 (0.53, 0.72) 
6 72.83 0.71 (0.62, 0.81) 0.71 (0.61, 0.80) 
7 91.30 0.91 (0.85, 0.97) 0.91 (0.84, 0.97) 
8 58.7 0.56 (0.46, 0.67) 0.56 (0.47, 0.67) 
9 83.7 0.83 (0.75, 0.91) 0.83 (0.75, 0.91) 
10 82.61 0.82 (0.73, 0.90) 0.82 (0.74, 0.90) 
11 86.96 0.86 (0.79, 0.93) 0.86 (0.78, 0.93) 
12 76.09 0.75 (0.65, 0.84) 0.75 (0.66, 0.84) 
13 76.09 0.75 (0.65, 0.84) 0.75 (0.65, 0.83) 
14 69.57 0.68 (0.58 ,0.78) 0.68 (0.57, 0.78) 
15 69.57 0.68 (0.60 ,0.78) 0.68 (0.57, 0.77) 
16 98.91 0.99 (0.97 ,1) 0.99 (0.95, 1) 
17 71.74 0.70 (0.60 ,0.80) 0.70 (0.60 ,0.81) 
18 70.65 0.69 (0.60, 0.79) 0.69 (0.60 ,0.78) 
19 90.22 0.90 (0.83 ,0.96) 0.90 (0.83 ,0.95) 
20 75 0.73 (0.64 ,0.83) 0.74 (0.63 ,0.82) 
21 83.7 0.83 (0.75 ,0.91) 0.83 (0.75, 0.90) 
22 73.91 0.72 (0.63 ,0.82) 0.73 (0.62 ,0.83) 
23 64.13 0.62 (0.51 ,0.72) 0.62 (0.51, 0.72) 
24 79.35 0.78 (0.69 ,0.87) 0.78 (0.69 ,0.86) 
25 80.43 0.79 (0.71 ,0.89) 0.79 (0.70, 0.87) 
26 86.96 0.86 (0.79, 0.93) 0.86 (0.78, 0.93) 
27 69.57 0.68 (0.58, 0.78) 0.68 (0.57, 0.78) 
28 94.57 0.94 (0.89, 0.99) 0.94 (0.89, 0.99) 
29 85.87 0.85 (0.78, 0.93) 0.85 (0.78, 0.92) 
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30 77.17 0.76 (0.67, 0.85) 0.76 (0.67, 0.85) 
31 79.35 0.78 (0.69, 0.86) 0.78 (0.69, 0.86) 
32 90.22 0.9 (0.83, 0.96) 0.9 (0.83, 0.95) 
33 76.09 0.75 (0.66, 0.83) 0.75 (0.65, 0.84) 
34 84.78 0.84 (0.76, 0.92) 0.84 (0.76, 0.91) 
35 79.35 0.78 (0.69, 0.87) 0.78 (0.69, 0.86) 
36 93.48 0.93 (0.88, 0.98) 0.93 (0.87, 0.98) 
37 85.87 0.85 (0.78, 0.93) 0.85 (0.77, 0.92) 
38 86.96 0.86 (0.79, 0.93) 0.86 (0.79, 0.93) 
39 75 0.74 (0.64, 0.83) 0.74 (0.63, 0.83) 
40 75 0.74 (0.64, 0.83) 0.74 (0.64, 0.83) 
41 94.57 0.94 (0.89, 0.99) 0.94 (0.89, 0.99) 
42 66.3 0.64 (0.54, 0.74) 0.64 (0.54, 0.75) 
43 77.17 0.76 (0.67, 0.85) 0.76 (0.66, 0.85) 
44 69.57 0.68 (0.58, 0.78) 0.68 (0.57, 0.77) 
45 70.65 0.69 (0.59, 0.79) 0.69 (0.57, 0.78) 
46 83.7 0.83 (0.75, 0.91) 0.83 (0.75, 0.91) 
47 88.04 0.87 (0.8, 0.94) 0.87 (0.79, 0.94) 
48 86.96 0.86 (0.79, 0.93) 0.86 (0.79, 0.93) 
49 70.65 0.69 (0.59, 0.79) 0.69 (0.59, 0.78) 
50 81.52 0.8 (0.72, 0.89) 0.81 (0.73, 0.87) 
51 72.83 0.71 (0.62, 0.81) 0.71 (0.62, 0.81) 
52 69.57 0.68 (0.58, 0.78) 0.68 (0.58, 0.77) 
53 71.74 0.70 (0.60, 0.80) 0.70 (0.61, 0.79) 
54 82.61 0.82 (0.73, 0.90) 0.82 (0.74, 0.90) 
55 79.35 0.78 (0.70, 0.87) 0.78 (0.69, 0.87) 
56 73.91 0.72 (0.63, 0.82) 0.73 (0.63, 0.81) 
57 97.83 0.98 (0.95, 1) 0.98 (0.94, 1) 
58 72.83 0.71 (0.62, 0.81) 0.71 (0.63, 0.80) 
59 78.26 0.77 (0.68, 0.86) 0.77 (0.68, 0.85) 











As Tables 4.2 and 4.4 show, the percent agreement ranged from 76.84% to 100% 
at the HFACS tier level, while at the HFACS causal category level, the range decreased, 
ranging from 56.84% to 98.95%. The overall average percent agreement at both the tier 
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and the causal category level were 90.22% and 78.45%, respectively. According to 
Wallace and Ross (2006), a 70% agreement between coders is considered a reasonable 
minimum for data to be deemed reliable, suggesting that at the tier level all coders were 
within the reliable level while at the causal category level, 11 coders were below the 
acceptable level with Coder 8 being well below this level.  
The examination of the Cohen‟s Kappa confidence intervals reveals that the 
values at both levels, tier and category, were all positive with no zero values, meaning 
that agreement exceeded chance at the 95% confidence level. Cohen's Kappa ranged from 
0.68 to 1.00 at the tier level, while at the category level it ranged from 0.54 to 0.99. Based 
on Landis and Koch (1977), the estimated Kappa values ranged from “substantial” to 
“perfect” agreement at the tier level, and “moderate” to “perfect” at the causal category 
level. 
Similar to Cohen‟s Kappa values, Krippendorff‟s Alpha ranged from 0.68 to 1.00 
at the tier level and 0.54 to 0.99 at the category level. According to Krippendorff (2006) 
while a Krippendorff‟s Alpha value above 0.79 is considered reliable, a value between 
0.667 and 0.800 can be used to draw tentative conclusions. In addition, the results of the 
analysis of all three reliability coefficients -- percent agreement, Cohen‟s Kappa, and 
Krippendorff‟s Alpha – agree that Coder 16 exhibits the highest agreement and Coder 8 
the lowest.  
The data included in Tables 4.2 to 4.5, are graphically presented in Figures 4.1 to 
4.4. These figures compare the frequency and distribution of the agreement coefficient 
values at both the HFACS tier level and HFACS causal category level. The figures show 
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similar trends and distributions for Cohen‟s Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha. Table 4.6 
includes the key for these figures.  





Cohen’s / Fliess’ Kappa Krippendorff’s 
Alpha 
 
Reliable Almost Perfect Reliability Reliable 
 
Almost reliable Substantial Reliability Tentative Reliability 
 












Figure 4.1: Frequency and Distribution of PA, K, and ; Intra-rater;  Tier Level; Individual Coders; 












Figure 4.2: Frequency and Distribution of PA, K, and ; Intra-rater;  Tier Level; Individual Coders; 
Excluding Compound Causal Factors 
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Figure 4.3: Frequency and Distribution of PA, K, and ; Intra-rater;  Category Level; Individual 














Figure 4.4: Frequency and Distribution of PA, K, and ; Intra-rater;  Category Level; Individual 
Coders; Excluding Compound Causal Factors  
 
 
Second the overall intra-rater reliability of each HFACS tier and each HFACS 
causal category was assessed using percent agreement and Krippendorff‟s Alpha. 
Although it was initially proposed to also use Cohen‟s Kappa, this analysis produced 
misleading results, negative Kappa values with very high agreement, a situation known as 
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sample prevalence, a widely cited limitation (paradox) of Cohen‟s Kappa; therefore, it 
was not used in this study. These results are tabulated in Tables 4.7 to 4.10, with Tables 
4.7 and 4.8 showing that although every tier met the reliability criteria for both reliability 
coefficients, the unsafe supervision tier exhibited the least agreement value among the 
four, indicating that it is the most problematic.  
 
 
Table 4.7: Intra-rater; Individual HFACS Tiers; Overall Average PA, and ; Whole Data 
Set 
HFACS Tier Average PA  
95 % CI 
Average PA 
Average α 
95 % CI 
Average α 
Unsafe Acts Tier 91.92 (90.38, 93.46) 0.88 (0.86,  0.90) 
Preconditions of Unsafe 
Acts Tier  
91.85 
(90.01, 93.70) 
0.87 (0.85,  0.90) 
Unsafe Supervision Tier 87.74 (85.42, 90.06) 0.83 (0.79,  0.86) 
Organizational 
Influences Tier 





Table 4.8: Intra-rater; Individual HFACS Tiers; Overall Average PA, and ; Excluding 
Compound Causal Factors  
HFACS Tier Average PA 
95 % CI 
Average PA 
Average α 
95 % CI 
Average α 
Unsafe Acts Tier 92.71 (91.19, 94.22) 0.89 (0.87 ,  0.90) 
Preconditions of Unsafe 
Acts Tier  
91.92 (90.07, 93.77) 0.88 (0.86 ,  0.90) 
Unsafe Supervision Tier 87.43 (85.15, 89.71) 0.83 (0.8 ,  0.85) 
Organizational 
Influences Tier 









Table 4.9: Intra-rater; Individual HFACS Categories; Overall Average PA, and ; Whole 





95 % CI 
Average PA 
Average α 









Skill Based Error 71.21 (65.15, 77.28) 0.66 (0.61, 0.72) 
Decision Error 62.90 (54.61, 71.18) 0.57 (0.49, 0.65) 
Perceptual Error 82.96 (78.07, 87.84) 0.82 (0.79, 0.86) 
Routine Violation 84.03 (80.12, 87.94) 0.82 (0.79, 0.86) 



















Physical Environment 88.38 (85.08, 91.68) 0.87 (0.84, 0.90) 
Technological 
Environment 
82.51 (77.34, 87.69) 0.75 (0.71, 0.80) 
Adverse Mental State 81.67 (76.86, 86.48) 0.78 (0.74, 0.82) 
Adverse Physiological 
State 
72 (65.5, 78.49) 0.68 (0.62, 0.74) 
Physical / Mental 
Limitations 




84.67 (78.91, 90.43) 0.83 (0.79, 0.88) 














Inadequate Supervision 73.27 (67, 79.55) 0.66 (0.60, 0.73) 
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations 
72.73 (65.09, 80.36) 0.64 (0.58, 0.71) 
Failed to Correct a 
Known Problem 
87.74 (83.85, 91.62) 0.85 (0.82, 0.89) 
















Resource / Acquisition 
Management 
79.29 (74.68, 83.90) 0.75 (0.71, 0.79) 
Organizational Climate 91.25 (87.70, 94.79) 0.89 (0.86, 0.92) 






Table 4.10: Intra-rater; Individual HFACS Categories; Overall Average PA, and ; 





95 % CI 
Average PA 
Average α 









Skill Based Error 72.22 (66.20, 78.25) 0.67 (0.62, 0.72) 
Decision Error 62.90 (54.61, 71.18) 0.57 (0.49, 0.65) 
Perceptual Error 84.71 (79.32, 90.09) 0.83 (0.79, 0.87) 
Routine Violation 84.03 (80.12, 87.94) 0.82 (0.79, 0.86) 



















Physical Environment 90.05 (87.01, 93.08) 0.88 (0.85, 0.91) 
Technological 
Environment 
82.49 (77.06, 87.92) 0.76 (0.72, 0.80) 
Adverse Mental State 83.11 (78.25, 87.97) 0.79 (0.75, 0.83) 
Adverse Physiological 
State 
73.08 (66.34, 79.83) 0.69 (0.63, 0.75) 
Physical / Mental 
Limitations 




84.67 (78.91, 90.43) 0.83 (0.79, 0.88) 














Inadequate Supervision 72.46 (66.27, 78.65) 0.66 (0.60, 0.73) 
Planned Inappropriate 
Operations 
72.75 (65.21, 80.30) 0.64 (0.58, 0.71) 
Failed to Correct a 
Known Problem 
87.74 (83.85, 91.62) 0.85 (0.82, 0.89) 
















Resource / Acquisition 
Management 
76.72 (71.85, 81.59) 0.75 (0.71, 0.78) 
Organizational Climate 90.68 (87.15, 94.22) 0.89 (0.86, 0.92) 






The overall intra-rater agreement values for each HFACS causal category is seen 
in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show a decline in percent agreement and Krippendorff‟s Alpha 
values in comparison with the HFACS tiers. In addition, the variability increased, as 
emphasized by an increase in the 95% confidence interval. Specifically, 8 categories -- 
Perceptual Error, Routine Violation, Physical Environment, Physical/Mental Limitations, 
Communication Coordination and Planning, Failed To Correct a Known Problem, 
Organizational Climate, and Organizational Process -- exhibited percent agreement and 
Krippendorff‟s Alpha values within the required reliability criteria. While two categories 
– Decision Error, and Supervisory Violation – exhibited percent agreement values below 
the required reliability criteria, the categories – Exceptional Violation, Technological 
Environment, Adverse Mental State, Adverse Physiological State, Fitness for Duty, and 
Resource/Acquisition Management – exhibited tentative values of Krippendorff‟s Alpha 
and the categories –  Decision Error, Skill Based Error, Inadequate Supervision, Planned 
Inappropriate Operations, and Supervisory Violation – exhibited Krippendorff‟s Alpha 
values well below the criterion, signifying that these five are the most problematic 
categories. 
4.2 Inter-rater Reliability Analysis  
Inter-rater reliability assessment receives the most research attention because 
intra-rater reliability alone is considered insufficient (Krippendorff, 2006). For this study, 
inter-rater reliability was determined separately for each session, R=125 participants from 
the first session and R= 59 from the second. In addition to analyzing the results with and 
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without the compound causal factors, the inter-rater reliability analysis also involved 
identifying 5 rogue coders, the analysis of which is shown in Appendix D, and 
conducting the analysis both with and without these coders. First, the overall inter-rater 
reliability for both the HFACS tier and the causal category levels was determined using 
percent agreement, Fleiss‟ Kappa, and Krippendorff‟s Alpha. Second, the overall inter-
rater reliability of each HFACS tier and causal category was determined using Fleiss‟ 
Kappa, and Krippendorff‟s Alpha. In addition, diagnostic analyses were conducted to 
assist in identifying problematic areas in the HFACS structure. These three analyses were 
conducted separately for the data obtained from each session.  
 
First Session  
 
Assessing the overall inter-rater reliability of HFACS for the tier and category 
levels involved determining the overall percent agreement, Fleiss‟ Kappa, and 
Krippendorff‟s Alpha for each level, which included the analysis of 3 data sets: I = 95 
and R = 125,  I = 95 and R =120, and I=92 and R =125. The results are tabulated in 
Tables 4.11 to 4.13 for the tier level and Tables 4.14 to 4.16 for the category level. 
Comparing the results of the agreement measures for the 3 analyses -- Table 4.11 to 
Table 4.13 and Table 4.14 to Table 4.15 – indicated no significant differences between 
the 3 data sets; thus, this discussion focuses only on the results of the analysis of the first 





Table 4.11: Inter-rater; Tier Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Whole Data Set; Including 
Rogue Coders, First Session 
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall 
Average Percent Agreement 84.77% (84.67, 84.87) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.79 (0.79, 0.79) 




Table 4.12: Inter-rater; Tier Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Whole Data Set; Excluding 
Rogue Coders; First Session  
 Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall  
Average Percent Agreement 85.33% (85.23, 85.46) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.80 (0.80, 0.80) 
Krippendorff's Alpha 0.80 (0.75, 0.84) 
 
 
Table 4.13: Inter-rater; Tier Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Excluding Compound Causal 
Factors; Including Rogue Coders; First Session  
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall  
Average Percent Agreement 85.37% (85.27, 85.48) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.80 (0.80, 0.80) 
Krippendorff's Alpha 0.80 (0.75, 0.85) 
 
 
Table 4.14: Inter-rater; Category Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Whole Data Set; 
Including Rogue Coders, First Session 
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall  
Average Percent Agreement 68.69% (68.52, 68.86) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.67 (0.67, 0.67) 
Krippendorff's Alpha 0.67 (0.66, 0.68) 
 
 
Table 4.15: Inter-rater; Category Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Whole Data Set; 
Excluding Rogue Coders; First Session 
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall  
Average Percent Agreement 69.9% (69.74, 70.06) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.68 (0.68, 0.68) 





Table 4.16: Inter-rater; Category Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Excluding Compound 
Causal Factors; Including Rogue Coders; First Session 
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall 
Average Percent Agreement 69.65% (69.47, 69.82) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.68 (0.68, 0.68) 
Krippendorff's Alpha 0.68 (0.67, 0.69) 
   
 
The overall average percent agreement at the tier level was 84.77%, suggesting an 
acceptable inter-rater reliability based on the 70% criterion.  The results of both Fleiss‟ 
Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha achieved a value of 0.79 although their computation 
differs for these two agreement coefficients.  
With respect to the category level, the values of the 3 agreement coefficients were 
lower than for the tier level. While the overall average percent agreement for the causal 
category level was 68.69%, approaching the required level to be considered reliable, both 
Fleiss‟ Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha values were KF =  = 0.67. Based on these 
results, the overall inter-rater reliability of HAFCS for the tier level is considered 
acceptable, while for the category level the overall inter-rater reliability is considered 
approximately reliable. 
Second, assessing the inter-rater reliability for each HFACS tier and causal 
category involved determining Fleiss‟ Kappa, and Krippendorff‟s Alpha for each level, 
which included the analysis of 3 data sets: I = 95 and R = 125,  I = 95 and R =120, and 
I=92 and R =125. The results are presented in Tables 4.17 to 4.19 for each tier level and 
Tables 4.20 to 4.22 for each category level. Similar to the previous results, the results of 
the agreement measures for the 3 analyses -- Tables 4.17 to 4.19 and Tables 4.20 to 4.22 
– indicated no significant differences between the 3 data sets; thus, this discussion 
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focuses only on the results of the analysis of the first data set, Tables 4.17 and 4.22 (I = 
95 and R = 125). 
 
 
Table 4.17: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Tiers; Overall KF and ; Whole Data Set; 
Including Rogue Coders, First Session 
HFACS Tier KF 95 % CI KF  
Unsafe Acts Tier 0.82 (0.81, 0.82) 0.82 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts Tier 0.80 (0.80, 0.80) 0.80 
Unsafe Supervision Tier 0.73 (0.73, 0.73) 0.73 




Table 4.18: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Tiers; Overall KF and ; Whole Data Set; 
Excluding Rogue Coders; First Session 
HFACS Tier KF 95 % CI KF  
Unsafe Acts Tier 0.83 (0.82, 0.83) 0.83 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts Tier 0.81 (0.80, 0.81) 0.81 
Unsafe Supervision Tier 0.74 (0.74, 0.74) 0.74 




Table 4.19: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Tiers; Overall KF and ; Excluding 
Compound Causal Factors; Including Rogue Coders; First Session 
HFACS Tier KF 95 % CI KF  
Unsafe Acts Tier 0.84 (0.83, 0.84) 0.84 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts Tier 0.82 (0.81, 0.82) 0.82 
Unsafe Supervision Tier 0.73 (0.73, 0.73) 0.73 








Table 4.20: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Categories; Overall KF and ; Whole Data 
Set; Including Rogue Coders, First Session 
 








Skill Based Error (SBE) 0.56 (0.55, 0.56) 0.56 
Decision Error (DE) 0.46 (0.46, 0.47) 0.46 
Perceptual Error (PE) 0.72 (0.72, 0.72) 0.72 
Routine Violation (RV) 0.76 (0.76, 0.76) 0.76 




















Physical Environment (PhE) 0.82 (0.82, 0.82) 0.82 
Technological Environment (TE) 0.65 (0.65, 0.65) 0.65 
Adverse Mental State (AMS) 0.68 (0.67, 0.68) 0.68 
Adverse Physiological State (APS) 0.63 (0.63, 0.63) 0.63 
Physical / Mental Limitations 
(PML) 
0.73 (0.73, 0.73) 0.73 
Communication Coordination & 
Planning (CC) 
0.78 (0.78, 0.78) 0.78 















Inadequate Supervision (IS) 0.51 (0.51, 0.51) 0.51 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 
(PIO) 
0.49 (0.49, 0.49) 0.49 
Failed To Correct a Known Problem 
(FTCNP) 
0.82 (0.81, 0.82) 0.82 
















Resource / Acquisition Management 
(RAM) 
0.62 (0.62, 0.62) 0.62 
Organizational Climate (OC) 0.80 (0.79, 0.80) 0.80 









Table 4.21: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Categories; Overall KF and ; Whole Data 
Set; Excluding Rogue Coders; First Session 
 








Skill Based Error (SBE) 0.57 (0.57, 0.58) 0.57 
Decision Error (DE) 0.48 (0.48, 0.49) 0.48 
Perceptual Error (PE) 0.73 (0.73, 0.73) 0.73 
Routine Violation (RV) 0.77 (0.77, 0.77) 0.77 




















Physical Environment (PhE) 0.83 (0.83, 0.83) 0.83 
Technological Environment (TE) 0.66 (0.66, 0.66) 0.66 
Adverse Mental State (AMS) 0.68 (0.68, 0.68) 0.68 
Adverse Physiological State (APS) 0.64 (0.64, 0.65) 0.64 
Physical / Mental Limitations (PML) 0.74 (0.73, 0.74) 0.74 
Communication Coordination & 
Planning (CC) 
0.78 (0.78, 0.79) 0.78 















Inadequate Supervision (IS) 0.52 (0.52, 0.53) 0.52 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 
(PIO) 
0.50 (0.5, 0.50) 0.50 
Failed To Correct a Known Problem 
(FTCNP) 
0.83 (0.83, 0.83) 0.83 
















Resource / Acquisition Management 
(RAM) 
0.63 (0.63, 0.63) 0.63 
Organizational Climate (OC) 0.81 (0.81, 0.81) 0.81 










Table 4.22: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Categories; Overall KF and ; Excluding 
Compound Causal Factors; Including Rogue Coders; First Session 
 








Skill Based Error (SBE) 0.57 (0.57, 0.58) 0.57 
Decision Error (DE) 0.46 (0.46, 0.47) 0.46 
Perceptual Error (PE) 0.74 (0.74, 0.74) 0.74 
Routine Violation (RV) 0.76 (0.76, 0.76) 0.76 




















Physical Environment (PhE) 0.86 (0.85, 0.86) 0.86 
Technological Environment (TE) 0.69 (0.68, 0.69) 0.69 
Adverse Mental State (AMS) 0.72 (0.71, 0.72) 0.72 
Adverse Physiological State (APS) 0.64 (0.64, 0.65) 0.64 
Physical / Mental Limitations (PML) 0.73 (0.73, 0.74) 0.73 
Communication Coordination & 
Planning (CC) 
0.78 (0.78, 0.78) 0.78 















Inadequate Supervision (IS) 0.51 (0.51, 0.51) 0.51 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 
(PIO) 
0.49 (0.49, 0.49) 0.49 
Failed To Correct a Known Problem 
(FTCNP) 
0.82 (0.81, 0.82) 0.82 
















Resource /Acquisition Management 
(RAM) 
0.62 (0.62, 0.62) 0.62 
Organizational Climate (OC) 0.80 (0.79, 0.8) 0.80 







Table 4.17 indicates that the estimated Fleiss‟ Kappa values for each tier ranged 
from 0.73 to 0.82, suggesting “substantial” to “near perfect” reliability for the individual 
tier levels according to Landis and Koch (1977); specifically, the Unsafe Supervision tier 
exhibited the lowest estimated Fleiss‟ Kappa value. Similar to the overall inter-rater 
analysis, the estimated Fleiss‟ Kappa for each causal category decreased. Tables 4.20 to 
4.22 show a decline in Fleiss‟ Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha values in comparison 
with the HFACS tiers. Fleiss‟ Kappa ranged from 0.46 to 0.82 for the individual 
categories. According to Landis and Koch (1977), these results suggest “moderate” to 
“near perfect” reliability for the individual causal categories. While two causal categories 
-- Physical Environment and  Failed To Correct a Known Problem --  exhibited “near 
perfect” reliability levels, 5 causal categories -- Skill Based Error, Decision Error, 
Inadequate Supervision, Planned Inappropriate Operations, and Supervisory Violation -- 
exhibited “moderate”  reliability levels, suggesting that these are the problematic 
categories; the remaining causal categories exhibited “substantial” reliability levels.  
  While Krippendorff‟s Alpha values were numerically identical to the Fleiss‟ 
Kappa values for both the tier and causal category levels, the reliability criteria differ for 
these two agreement coefficients. The individual Krippendorff‟s Alpha value for each 
HFACS tier, as shown in Table 4.17, ranged from 0.73 to 0.82. According to 
Krippendorff (2006), the overall Alpha values for all individual tiers are considered 
reliable except for the Unsafe Acts tier, which is considered “tentatively” reliable.  
Similar to Fliess‟ Kappa values, Krippendorff‟s Alpha values for the causal category 
level were lower than the tier level, these values ranging from 0.46 to 0.82, suggesting a 
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heterogeneous outcome. Only 3 categories -- Physical Environment, Failed To Correct a 
Known Problem and Organizational Climate -- are considered reliable, while 7 categories 
-- Perceptual Error, Routine Violation, Adverse Mental State, Physical/Mental 
Limitations, Communication Coordination and Planning, Fitness for Duty, and 
Organizational Process -- exhibited Krippendorff‟s Alpha values between 0.67 and 0.79, 
also considered “tentatively” reliable. The remaining 9 categories -- Skill Based Error, 
Decision Error, Exceptional Violation, Technological Environment, Adverse 
Physiological State, Inadequate Supervision, Planned Inappropriate Operations, 
Supervisory Violation, and Resource/Acquisition Management -- are considered 
unreliable.  
The reliability determined by both of Fleiss‟ Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha, 
which take into account chance in their calculations, was in agreement for 3 HFACS tiers 
(Table 4.17) -- Unsafe Acts, Unsafe Supervision, and Organizational Influences – and 14 
HFACS causal categories (Table 4.20) -- Skill Based Error, Decision Error, Perceptual 
Error, Routine Violation, Physical Environment, Adverse Mental State, Physical/Mental 
Limitations, Communication Coordination and Planning, Fitness for Duty, Inadequate 
Supervision, Planned Inappropriate Operations, Failed To Correct a Known Problem, 
Supervisory Violation, and Organizational Process. However, these two reliability criteria 
did not agree on the remaining 5 causal categories.  
In general, the overall and the individual inter-rater reliability for the tier level 
exhibited acceptable levels; however, the overall and the individual inter-rater reliability 
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at the causal category level was less consistently acceptable, suggesting the need for 
further analyses for the individual causal categories.    
Diagnostic analysis using item analysis was conducted on all of the causal factors 
(I = 95) included in the survey including all coders (R=125) to determine the most and 
less frequently chosen causal categories for each causal factor. Such knowledge has the 
potential to indicate common misconceptions and misunderstandings of particular 
categories among coders, providing insight for appropriate remediation. Item analysis 
shows, for each causal factor, represented as a row, the distribution of coders responses 
with respect to HFACS categories. The results of such analysis are presented by 
percentage in Table 4.23. For each causal category, beginning with Skill Based Error, the 
causal factor item in the survey with the highest percentage referring to a particular 





Table 4.23: Percentage of Coders Responses to Each Statement for First Session 
Statement 
Number 
SBE DE PE RV EV PhE TE AMS APS PML CC FfD IS PIO FTCNP SV RAM OC OP 
49 86.4 6.4 2.4 1.6 1.6 0 0 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
65 82.4 6.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.8 0 5.6 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 
6 80.8 17.6 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
51 77.6 10.4 4 0 1.6 0 0 6.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* 92  44 0 0.8 0 3.2 30.4 0 21.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
79 17.6 76.8 0.8 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 
12 4 72 4.8 2.4 7.2 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0.8 0 0 0 
72 31.2 66.4 1.6 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
83 24 60.8 0 0 2.4 0 0 0 0 8 0 0.8 2.4 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 
64 2.4 40 0 0.8 14.4 6.4 0 0.8 0 0 0.8 0 0 8 4.8 21.6 0 0 0 
81 1.6 0 97.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
62 4 1.6 93.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
84 7.2 20 72.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 24 3.2 72 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
91 32.8 2.4 64.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* 24 2.4 0.8 58.4 0 0 1.6 26.4 4.8 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0.8 
67 0 1.6 0 95.2 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.8 0 0.8 0 0 0 
78 0 0.8 0 94.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0 0 93.6 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0 0.8 1.6 0 0.8 0.8 
29 1.6 2.4 0 92 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 
61 0 0 0 83.2 0.8 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0.8 0.8 7.2 1.6 0 4.8 0 
86 0 0.8 0 7.2 91.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
68 3.2 6.4 0 1.6 88 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





SBE DE PE RV EV PhE TE AMS APS PML CC FfD IS PIO FTCNP SV RAM OC OP 
52 1.6 4.8 0 15.2 77.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 
46 0 0.8 0 8 49.6 0 0 14.4 16.8 0 0 7.2 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
53 0 0 0 0 0 98.4 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 
34 0 0 0 0 0 94.4 3.2 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 
13 0 0 0 0 0.8 93.6 4.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 
77 0 0 0 0.8 0 91.2 5.6 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0.8 
39 0 0 0 0.8 0 90.4 1.6 0 0 2.4 0 0 0 0 2.4 0.8 0 0 1.6 
44 0 0 1.6 0 0 0 98.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
95 0.8 0 7.2 0 0 4 80.8 0 0 0.8 1.6 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 4 
14 0 0 0 0.8 0 0.8 74.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 18.4 0 1.6 
2 0 0.8 0 5.6 0 28.8 35.2 0 0 0 0.8 0 0.8 8 6.4 0.8 5.6 0.8 6.4 
47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97.6 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94.4 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 1.6 0 
69 0.8 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 91.2 4 0.8 0.8 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 1.6 0 2.4 0 0 0.8 0.8 76.8 1.6 9.6 0 0 0.8 4 0 0 1.6 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75.2 11.2 3.2 0 2.4 0 6.4 0 0 1.6 0 0 
89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95.2 4.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.8 84 3.2 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0.8 8 2.4 0 0.8 4 0 0 72 1.6 0 9.6 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 
66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.4 67.2 13.6 0 0.8 1.6 6.4 0 0 0 0 0 
* 93 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.6 57.6 0 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.8 0 0.8 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0 0 
82 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 2.4 0 0 95.2 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 94.4 0 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
71 0 0 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 4.8 92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





SBE DE PE RV EV PhE TE AMS APS PML CC FfD IS PIO FTCNP SV RAM OC OP 
43 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 99.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.8 0 0.8 96.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
73 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 96.8 0 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 
32 4 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 90.4 0 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 
22 0.8 8.8 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 60 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 3.2 3.2 0 92.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
58 0 1.6 0 0 2.4 0 0 4 1.6 0 0 88 0.8 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 4.8 0.8 0 86.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
80 0 0 0 0 2.4 0 0 8.8 7.2 0 0 81.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
70 0.8 4 0.8 0 0 0 0 3.2 28.8 0 0.8 61.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 87.2 5.6 0 5.6 0 0 0 
63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 4 0.8 0 81.6 0 0 1.6 8.8 0.8 1.6 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 76 12.8 0 8 0.8 0 1.6 
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.2 0 0 4 0 58.4 0.8 1.6 1.6 0 25.6 0.8 
8 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 35.2 0 54.4 1.6 2.4 4 0 0 0.8 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.2 0 4.8 87.2 3.2 0 1.6 0 0 
31 0 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.8 0 0 12.8 64.8 0.8 12 3.2 0 0 
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 17.6 60 5.6 12 0 0 4 
60 0 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.2 60 0.8 4.8 24.8 0 0.8 
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96.8 3.2 0 0 0 
55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0.8 95.2 2.4 0 0 0 
94 0 0 0 0 0 2.4 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95.2 1.6 0 0 0 
45 0 0.8 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.8 94.4 2.4 0 0 0 
87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93.6 2.4 3.2 0 0 
48 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 14.4 0 33.6 9.6 36 0 0.8 0.8 0 





SBE DE PE RV EV PhE TE AMS APS PML CC FfD IS PIO FTCNP SV RAM OC OP 
25 0 0.8 0 9.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 7.2 1.6 76.8 0.8 1.6 0 
23 0 0.8 0 11.2 8.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.6 0.8 72.8 0 0 0 
74 2.4 5.6 0 8.8 19.2 0 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 60 0 0.8 0.8 
33 2.4 0 0 3.2 21.6 0 0 0 0 13.6 0 3.2 8 1.6 0 22.4 16.8 0.8 6.4 
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 96 0.8 1.6 
37 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0 0.8 92 0.8 4 
1 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 2.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 4 89.6 0.8 1.6 
57 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0 0 10.4 1.6 0 4 61.6 4.8 15.2 
85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58.4 2.4 39.2 
76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 1.6 0 96 1.6 
4 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 4.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94.4 0 
30 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 2.4 0 0 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 93.6 0.8 
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 1.6 0 0 2.4 87.2 8 
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.4 0 0 12 0 2.4 5.6 0 0 1.6 72 0 
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 1.6 0.8 1.6 93.6 
59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.8 0 0.8 0 0 0 7.2 1.6 88.8 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0 4.8 1.6 0.8 0 2.4 3.2 85.6 
56 0 0 0 0 0 0 14.4 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 1.6 0 3.2 0.8 79.2 
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.2 2.4 0 0 12 1.6 76.8 





Second Session  
 
The 3 analyses conducted on the data obtained from the first session were also 
conducted for the data obtained from the second, R=59 participants in which 4 coders 
were identified as rogue. Additionally, the analyses were also conducted with and without 
the 3 compound causal factors ((I = 95 and I = 92). First, the overall inter-rater reliability 
of HFACS for the tier and category levels was determined using the overall average 
percent agreement, Fleiss‟ Kappa, and Krippendorff‟s Alpha for each level, which 
included the analysis of 3 data sets: I = 95 and R = 59,  I = 95 and R =55, and I=92 and R 
=59. The results are tabulated in Tables 4.24 to 4.26 for the tier level and Tables 4.27 to 
4.29 for the category level. As for the first session, the comparison of the results of the 
agreement measures for the data sets indicated no significant differences between the 3 
data sets; thus, this discussion focuses only on the results of the analysis of the first data 
set, Tables 4.24 and 4.27 (I = 95 and R = 59). 
 
Table 4.24: Inter-rater; Tier Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Whole Data Set; Including 
Rogue Coders, Second Session 
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall  
Average Percent Agreement 85.25% (84.99, 85.55) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.80 (0.79, 0.80) 




Table 4.25: Inter-rater; Tier Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Whole Data Set; Excluding 
Rogue Coders; Second Session 
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall  
Average Percent Agreement 86.20% (85.95, 85.46) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.81 (0.81, 0.81) 





Table 4.26: Inter-rater; Tier Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Excluding Compound Causal 
Factors; Including Rogue Coders; Second Session  
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall  
Average Percent Agreement 85.86% (85.59, 86.13) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.81 (0.81, 0.81) 
Krippendorff's Alpha 0.81 (0.76, 0.85) 
 
 
Table 4.27: Inter-rater; Category Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Whole Data Set; 
Including Rogue Coders, Second Session 
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall  
Average Percent Agreement 68.10% (67.97, 68.52) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.66 (0.66, 0.66) 




Table 4.28: Inter-rater; Category Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Whole Data Set; 
Excluding Rogue Coders; Second Session 
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall  
Average Percent Agreement 69.52% (69.10, 69.94) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.68 (0.68, 0.68) 




Table 4.29: Inter-rater; Category Level; Overall PA, KF, and ; Excluding Compound 
Causal Factors; Including Rogue Coders; Second Session  
Agreement Measure Overall 95% CI for Overall 
Average Percent Agreement 69.05% (68.91, 69.48) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.67 (0.67, 0.67) 
Krippendorff's Alpha 0.67 (0.66, 0.68) 
   
 
The overall average percent agreement at the tier level was 85.25%, suggesting an 
acceptable inter-rater reliability based on the 70% criterion. In addition, the results of 
both Fleiss‟ Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha values, which take agreement by chance 
into consideration, were 0.80. However, for the category level, the values of the 3 
agreement coefficients were lower than for the tier level. While the overall average 
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percent agreement for the causal category level was 68.10%, approaching the required 
level to be considered reliable, both Fleiss‟ Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha values were 
KF =  = 0.66. Based on these results, the overall inter-rater reliability of HFACS for the 
tier level is considered acceptable, while for the category level the overall inter-rater 
reliability is considered approximately reliable. 
Second, Fleiss‟ Kappa, and Krippendorff‟s Alpha for each level were determined 
to assess the inter-rater reliability for each HFACS tier and causal category, which 
included analyzing 3 data sets: I = 95 and R = 59,  I = 95 and R =55, and I=92 and R =59. 
The results are presented in Tables 4.30 to 4.32 for each tier level and Tables 4.33 to 4.35 
for each category level. Similar to the previous results, the results of the agreement 
measures for the 3 analyses – Tables 4.30 to 4.32 and Tables 4.33 to 4.35 – indicated no 
substantial differences between the 3 data sets; thus, this discussion focuses only on the 
results of the analysis that included whole dataset; including Rogue Coders, Tables 4.30 
and 4.33 (I = 95 and R = 59). 
 
Table 4.30: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Tiers; Overall KF and ; Whole Data Set; 
Including Rogue Coders, Second Session 
HFACS Tier KF 95 % CI KF  
Unsafe Acts Tier 0.82 (0.82, 0.83) 0.82 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts Tier 0.81 (0.81, 0.82) 0.80 
Unsafe Supervision Tier 0.74 (0.74, 0.75) 0.73 
Organizational Influences Tier 0.80 (0.79, 0.80) 0.80 
 
 
Table 4.31: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Tiers; Overall KF and ; Whole Data Set; 
Excluding Rogue Coders; Second Session 
HFACS Tier KF 95 % CI KF  
Unsafe Acts Tier 0.84 (0.83, 0.84) 0.84 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts Tier 0.82 (0.82, 0.83) 0.82 
Unsafe Supervision Tier 0.76 (0.76, 0.77) 0.76 
Organizational Influences Tier 0.81 (0.80, 0.81) 0.81 
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Table 4.32: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Tiers; Overall KF and ;Excluding Compound 
Causal Factors; Including Rogue Coders; Second Session 
HFACS Tier KF 95 % CI KF  
Unsafe Acts Tier 0.84 (0.84, 0.85) 0.84 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts Tier 0.83 (0.82, 0.83) 0.83 
Unsafe Supervision Tier 0.74 (0.74, 0.75) 0.74 
Organizational Influences Tier 0.80 (0.79, 0.80) 0.80 
 
 
Table 4.33: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Categories; Overall KF and ; Whole Data 
Set; Including Rogue Coders, Second Session 
 








Skill Based Error (SBE) 0.54 (0.53, 0.54) 0.54 
Decision Error (DE) 0.46 (0.45, 0.46) 0.45 
Perceptual Error (PE) 0.72 (0.71, 0.72) 0.71 
Routine Violation (RV) 0.76 (0.75, 0.76) 0.76 




















Physical Environment (PhE) 0.83 (0.82, 0.83) 0.83 
Technological Environment (TE) 0.62 (0.61, 0.62) 0.61 
Adverse Mental State (AMS) 0.69 (0.69, 0.70) 0.69 
Adverse Physiological State 
(APS) 
0.58 (0.57, 0.58) 0.58 
Physical / Mental Limitations 
(PML) 
0.76 (0.75, 0.76) 0.75 
Communication Coordination & 
Planning (CC) 
0.78 (0.78, 0.79) 0.78 















Inadequate Supervision (IS) 0.53 (0.52, 0.53) 0.52 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 
(PIO) 
0.52 (0.52, 0.53) 0.52 
Failed To Correct a Known 
Problem (FTCNP) 
0.81 (0.80, 0.81) 0.81 
















Resource / Acquisition 
Management (RAM) 
0.66 (0.66, 0.67) 0.66 
Organizational Climate (OC) 0.82 (0.81, 0.82) 0.82 





Table 4.34: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Categories; Overall KF and ; Whole Data 
Set; Excluding Rogue Coders; Second Session 
 








Skill Based Error (SBE) 0.55 (0.54, 0.55) 0.55 
Decision Error (DE) 0.50 (0.50, 0.51) 0.50 
Perceptual Error (PE) 0.74 (0.74, 0.75) 0.74 
Routine Violation (RV) 0.77 (0.76, 0.77) 0.77 




















Physical Environment (PhE) 0.84 (0.83, 0.84) 0.84 
Technological Environment (TE) 0.64 (0.63, 0.64) 0.64 
Adverse Mental State (AMS) 0.70 (0.70, 0.71) 0.70 
Adverse Physiological State 
(APS) 
0.59 (0.58, 0.59) 0.59 
Physical / Mental Limitations 
(PML) 
0.76 (0.76, 0.77) 0.76 
Communication Coordination & 
Planning (CC) 
0.79 (0.79, 0.80) 0.79 















Inadequate Supervision (IS) 0.54 (0.53, 0.54) 0.54 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 
(PIO) 
0.54 (0.53, 0.55) 0.54 
Failed To Correct a Known 
Problem (FTCNP) 
0.82 (0.81, 0.82) 0.82 


















0.66 (0.66, 0.67) 0.66 
Organizational Climate (OC) 0.82 (0.82, 0.83) 0.82 













Table 4.35: Inter-rater; Individual HFACS Categories; Overall KF and ;  Excluding 
Compound Causal Factors; Including Rogue Coders; Second Session 
 








Skill Based Error (SBE) 0.56 (0.55, 0.56) 0.56 
Decision Error (DE) 0.47 (0.46, 0.47) 0.47 
Perceptual Error (PE) 0.75 (0.74, 0.75) 0.75 
Routine Violation (RV) 0.76 (0.75, 0.76) 0.76 




















Physical Environment (PhE) 0.86 (0.85, 0.86) 0.86 
Technological Environment (TE) 0.65 (0.64, 0.65) 0.65 
Adverse Mental State (AMS) 0.73 (0.73, 0.74) 0.73 
Adverse Physiological State 
(APS) 
0.58 (0.57, 0.58) 0.58 
Physical / Mental Limitations 
(PML) 
0.76 (0.75, 0.76) 0.76 
Communication Coordination & 
Planning (CC) 
0.78 (0.78, 0.79) 0.78 















Inadequate Supervision (IS) 0.52 (0.52, 0.53) 0.52 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 
(PIO) 
0.52 (0.52, 0.53) 0.52 
Failed To Correct a Known 
Problem (FTCNP) 
0.81 (0.80, 0.81) 0.81 


















0.66 (0.66, 0.67) 0.66 
Organizational Climate (OC) 0.82 (0.81, 0.82) 0.82 





Table 4.30 indicates that the estimated Fleiss‟ Kappa values for each tier ranged 
from 0.74 to 0.82, suggesting “substantial” to “near perfect” reliability for the individual 
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tier levels according to Landis and Koch (1977). As in the first session, the Unsafe 
Supervision tier exhibited the lowest estimated Fleiss‟ Kappa value. In addition,       
Tables 4.33 to 4.35 show a decline in Fleiss‟ Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha values in 
comparison with the HFACS tiers. Fleiss‟ Kappa ranged from 0.46 to 0.83 for the 
individual categories. According to Landis and Koch (1977), these results suggest 
“moderate” to “near perfect” reliability for the individual causal categories. While three 
causal categories -- Physical Environment, Failed To Correct a Known Problem, and 
Organizational Process --  exhibited “near perfect” reliability levels, 6 causal categories -- 
Skill Based Error, Decision Error, Adverse Physiological State, Inadequate Supervision, 
Planned Inappropriate Operations, and Supervisory Violation -- exhibited “moderate”  
reliability levels, suggesting that these are the problematic categories; the remaining 
causal categories exhibited “substantial” reliability levels.  
  Similarly, the individual Krippendorff‟s Alpha values for each HFACS tier, as 
shown in Table 4.33, ranged from 0.73 to 0.82. According to Krippendorff (2006), the 
overall Alpha values for all individual tiers are considered reliable except for the Unsafe 
Acts tier, which is considered “tentatively” reliable.  Similar to Fliess‟ Kappa values, 
Krippendorff‟s Alpha values for the causal category level were lower than the tier level, 
these values ranging from 0.45 to 0.83, suggesting a heterogeneous outcome. Only 3 
categories -- Physical Environment, Failed To Correct a Known Problem and 
Organizational Climate -- are considered reliable, while 8 categories -- Perceptual Error, 
Routine Violation, Exceptional Violation, Adverse Mental State, Physical/Mental 
Limitations, Communication Coordination and Planning, Resource/Acquisition 
Management, and Organizational Process -- exhibited Krippendorff‟s Alpha values 
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between 0.67 and 0.79, also considered “tentatively” reliable. The remaining 8 categories 
-- Skill Based Error, Decision Error, Technological Environment, Adverse Physiological 
State, Fitness for Duty, Inadequate Supervision, Planned Inappropriate Operations, and 
Supervisory Violation -- are considered unreliable.  
As in the first session, diagnostic analysis using item analysis was conducted on 
all of the causal factors (I = 95) included in the survey including all coders (R=59) to 
determine the most and least frequently chosen causal categories for each causal factor. 
The results of this analysis are presented by percentage in Table 4.36. For each causal 
category, beginning with Skill Based Error, the causal factor item in the survey with the 
highest percentage referring to a particular category is arranged in descending order; 





Table 4.36: Percentage of Coders Responses to each Statement for Second Session 
Statement 
Number 
SBE DE PE RV EV PhE TE AMS APS PML CC FfD IS PIO FTCNP SV RAM OC OP 
65 89.8 6.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
49 84.7 5.1 5.1 1.7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 78 19 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
51 71.2 19 5.1 0 2 0 0 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* 92 40.7 5.1 3.4 0 0 20 0 30.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
79 11.9 81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 3.4 1.7 0 0 0 
12 3.4 68 5.1 3.4 5 0 0 10.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.1 0 0 0 
72 32.2 68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
83 30.5 56 1.7 0 2 0 0 0 0 5.1 0 0 5.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
64 5.1 54 0 1.7 10 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 10.2 0 15 0 0 0 
81 3.4 1.7 95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
62 3.4 3.4 93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
84 5.1 8.5 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 28.8 3.4 66 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
91 32.2 0 64 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* 24 0 3.4 58 0 0 3.4 27 5.1 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 
67 0 0 0 98 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
78 0 0 0 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 
18 0 0 0 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 3.4 0 0 5.1 0 
29 0 5.1 0 88 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 3.4 0 0 0 
61 0 0 0 81 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.8 5.1 1.7 3.4 0 
68 3.4 5.1 0 0 92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
86 0 0 0 10 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
54 0 1.7 0 17 81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





SBE DE PE RV EV PhE TE AMS APS PML CC FfD IS PIO FTCNP SV RAM OC OP 
46 0 1.7 0 14 59 0 0 3.4 8.5 0 0 10.2 1.7 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 
33 0 0 0 1.7 24 0 0 0 0 11.9 0 8.5 5.1 0 0 19 18.6 0 12 
39 0 0 0 0 0 98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 
34 0 0 0 0 0 97 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 
53 0 0 0 0 0 97 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 95 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 
77 0 0 0 0 0 86 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 3.4 0 0 
44 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 98 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
95 0 0 6.8 0 0 14 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 1.7 0 1.7 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 0 25.4 1.7 1.7 
2 0 0 0 0 0 29 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 10.2 8.5 0 1.7 1.7 8.5 
7 1.7 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 84.7 3.4 6.8 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 69.5 14 5.1 0 3.4 0 3.4 0 5.1 0 0 0 
47 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 96.6 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 
69 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 91.5 1.7 0 0 5.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94.9 3.4 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 92 3.4 0 5.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 78 3.4 0 15.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 8.5 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 73 3.4 0 13.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* 93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.8 63 0 0 30.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13.6 61 16.9 0 5.1 0 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 
82 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 2 0 0 96.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 96.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
71 0 0 5.1 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 93.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 5.1 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 88.1 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 





SBE DE PE RV EV PhE TE AMS APS PML CC FfD IS PIO FTCNP SV RAM OC OP 
43 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
73 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 97 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 3.4 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 92 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 10.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58 1.7 27 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.5 3.4 0 88.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.1 12 0 0 83.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
58 0 1.7 0 0 3 0 0 5.1 12 0 0 76.3 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 
80 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 15.3 14 0 0 69.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
70 1.7 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 37 0 0 55.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 88 3.4 0 6.8 0 0 0 
63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 0 0 83 0 0 0 8.5 0 5.1 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 18.6 0 1.7 3.4 0 0 
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.1 0 0 3.4 0 63 1.7 0 0 0 27.1 0 
8 3.4 5.1 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0 61 1.7 0 3.4 0 0 0 
48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 10 0 36 13.6 32.2 5.1 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.1 83.1 10.2 1.7 0 0 0 
31 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 78 0 8.5 1.7 0 0 
60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 15 69.5 0 0 13.6 0 0 
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 61 3.4 15 0 0 6.8 
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96.6 3.4 0 0 0 
55 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96.6 1.7 0 0 0 
94 0 0 0 0 0 5.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94.9 0 0 0 0 
45 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 93.2 1.7 0 0 0 
87 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88.1 3.4 5.1 1.7 0 





SBE DE PE RV EV PhE TE AMS APS PML CC FfD IS PIO FTCNP SV RAM OC OP 
23 0 3.4 0 8.5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 3.4 1.7 76 0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 6.8 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.1 8.5 5.1 71 0 1.7 0 
74 3.4 8.5 0 10 27 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 98.3 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94.9 0 1.7 
37 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94.9 0 3.4 
57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.1 1.7 0 6.8 71.2 3.4 12 
85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 57.6 0 41 
76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 98.3 1.7 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96.6 0 
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96.6 0 
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 0 0 0 3.4 89.8 5.1 
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.5 1.7 0 14 0 0 5.1 0 0 1.7 69.5 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 0 3.4 3.4 0 0 0 1.7 88 
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 0 0 1.7 3.4 1.7 88 
59 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 8.5 0 0 0 3.4 1.7 85 
56 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 1.7 0 1.7 1.7 1.7 0 1.7 1.7 75 
42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 1.7 0 0 10.2 1.7 73 






In general, in both reliability sessions, the overall and the individual inter-rater 
reliability for the tier level exhibited acceptable levels; however, the overall and the 
individual inter-rater reliability at the causal category level was less consistently 
acceptable. Furthermore, the overall intra-rater reliability of HFACS were 5% higher than 
the overall inter-rater reliability for the tier level, while for the category level this 
percentage increased to approximately 14%. In addition, the intra-rater reliability levels, 
which ranged from 0.57-0.89 for each HFACS category, were higher than the inter-rater 
reliability levels, which ranged from 0.46-0.82. Based on the results of both the intra-
rater and inter-rater agreement coefficient values, the HFACS categories can be grouped 
into four groups based on their level of reliability, those exhibiting acceptable intra-rater 
and inter-rater reliability levels, those exhibiting acceptable intra-rater reliability levels 
and “tentatively”/“substantially” inter-rater reliability levels, those exhibiting 
“tentatively”/“substantially” levels for both intra-rater and inter-rater reliability, and 












CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter discusses the main findings of the overall intra-rater and inter-rater 
reliability of HFACS, in terms of its analysis, relation to other research, and 
contributions. Furthermore, it also considers the intra-rater and inter-rater reliability of 
HFACS for each tier and category. The 4 HFACS tiers are referred here as the macro-
scale, corresponding to the 4 basic levels of the Swiss cheese model (Reason, 1990), 
while the finer level of the HFACS taxonomy, representing the 19 categories is referred 
to as the micro-scale. Section one considers in detail the intra-rater reliability of HFACS 
including the overall, macro-scale, and micro-scale, while section two discusses the   
inter-rater reliability across all levels, covering the overall, macro-scale, and micro-scale.  
 
5.1 Intra-rater Reliability Discussion  
In this study, the overall intra-rater reliability of HFACS at the macro-scale 
achieved acceptable levels based on percent agreement, Cohen‟s Kappa, and 
Krippendorff‟s Alpha values, while at the micro-scale these values declined; although 
considered reliable based on percent agreement values, according to Krippendorff‟s 
Alpha and Cohen‟s Kappa values, it achieved “tentative” and “substantial” reliability 
levels, respectively. While the studies in the safety literature on the reliability of HFACS 
in general are limited, as can be seen in Table 5.1, specifically, test-retest reliability has 




reliability of the HFACS-ADF derivative using percent agreement achieving 41%, well 
below the 70% agreement criterion considered reliable, while in the study reported here a 
78.45% was achieved.  
This contrast in the results between the two studies is perhaps due to several 
factors. First, the instrument used differed. While this study focused on the HFACS, 
Olsen and Shorrock (2010) used the HFACS-ADF derivative, a framework, although 
similar to the basic HFACS structure, includes additional causal categories. Another 
important factor is that in Olsen and Shorrock‟s (2010) study, the coders were given 
accident reports containing several causal factors that needed to be identified before they 
could be coded, whereas in this study the causal factors were pre-identified. Ross, 
Wallace, & Davies (2004) emphasize that the results of reliability studies using actual 
reports are 10% lower than those using pre-identified causal factors. Moreover, the 
duration between the two sessions differed; while in Olsen and Shorrock‟s (2010) study, 
the duration varied from 4 to 11 months; in this study it was much shorter, only 2 weeks, 
perhaps indicating that over time as memory fades, the positive effects of training on test-
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In addition, the intra-rater reliability of HFACS at the macro scale was also 
considered acceptable, indicating that all tiers achieved acceptable levels of test-retest 
reliability. This result suggests that at the macro scale an internal consistency within the 
coders was achieved and the same level of understanding was maintained after a two-
week period. However, the intra-rater reliability levels of HFACS at the micro-scale were 
generally lower than the macro-scale, the results ranging from reliable, tentatively 
reliable and unreliable. Eight categories – Perceptual Error, Routine Violation, Physical 
Environment, Physical/Mental Limitations, Communication Coordination and Planning, 
Failed To Correct a Known Problem, Organizational Climate, and Organizational Process 
– exhibited acceptable levels of intra-rater reliability, whereas 6 categories – Exceptional 
Violation, Technological Environment, Adverse Mental State, Adverse Physiological 
State, Fitness for Duty, and Resource/Acquisition Management – exhibited tentative 
levels of intra-rater reliability, indicating that for these 14 categories at the micro scale 
the coders maintained a consistent level of understanding after a two-week period. 
However, the remaining 5 categories – Skill Based Error, Decision Error, Inadequate 
Supervision, Planned Inappropriate Operations and Supervisory Violation – exhibited 
unacceptable intra-rater reliability levels, indicating that the coders were inconsistent in 
their responses of classifying the causal factors corresponding to these categories. As 
inter-rater reliability combines both stability and reproducibility, the factors that may 





The reduction of the intra-rater reliability levels from the macro scale to the micro 
scale is expected because as past research has emphasized, as the number of categories 
increases, reliability decreases. For example, Gwent (2011) demonstrated through a 
Monte-Carlo experiment, the results which are presented in Figure 5.1, that Kappa‟s 
critical value decreases as the number of categories increases, while the number of causal 
factors (I) are kept constant. In addition, Figure 5.1 shows that as the number of causal 
factors (I) increases in a test-retest reliability study, the Kappa values become more 











Figure 5. 1: Kappa Coefficient by Number of Causal Factors and Number of Response Categories 
Under Random Rating (Gwent, 2011) 
 




An additional factor that might have contributed to the lower levels of the intra-
rater reliability at the micro-scale may be related to the limitation of conducting the two 
reliability trials in two different settings. While the first session was conducted in an 
unconstrained timed classroom setting immediately at the end the HFACS training at the 
location of the training, the second was conducted in a work and/or home environment 
setting with a 72-hour timeframe restriction. This limitation was uncontrollable due to the 
remote distance of the participants, making it impractical to set up a reliability trial 
similar to the first.  
Intra-rater reliability, also referred to as stability, is limited as it investigates only 
whether the coder was consistent in his responses in the first and second trial; thus, no 
judgment can be made as to whether inconsistency was due to improvement or regression 
in the coding.  Thus, it is considered the weakest form of reliability; however, the first 
step in investigating the reliability HFACS was to evaluate its stability as internal 
inconsistencies may limit its inter-rater reliability.  Evaluating the inter-rater reliability, 
also known as reproducibility, incorporates investigating both intra-coder inconsistencies 
and inter-coder differences (Krippendorff, 2006), thus it is a significantly stronger 
measure of reliability. 
5.2 Inter-rater Reliability Discussion  
The overall inter-rater reliability of HFACS at the macro-scale tier level was 
considered acceptable by percent agreement, substantial by Fleiss‟ Kappa, and tentatively 




micro-scale category level, the agreement coefficient value for the latter two was 0.67, in 
the lower ranges of substantially reliable for Fleiss‟ Kappa and tentatively reliable for 
Krippendorff‟s Alpha 
While several studies used different agreement coefficients in evaluating the  
overall inter-rater reliability of HFACS, the ones comparable to this research using 
percent agreement are Olsen (2011) and Olsen and Shorrock (2010).  In Olsen‟s (2011) 
study, the overall inter-rater reliability at the macro-scale tier level was 23.35% to 
33.55%, lower than the results found here, while at the micro-scale category level this 
percentage difference increased to 47.4% to 50%. This variation in the results perhaps 
may have been due to differences in training method; while in Olsen‟s (2011) study the 
coders were self-trained, using a training workbook that included definitions for each 
category in the HFACS taxonomy, examples, and a solved example to practice coding, in 
this study the coders attended a 2-day face-to-face training workshop on HFACS. The 
face-to-face training is supported by Shohamy, Gordon and Kraemer (1992) who found 
that the overall inter-rater reliability levels were higher for classroom trained coders than 
they were for the untrained ones. Similarly, in Olsen and Shorrock (2010) the overall        
inter-rater reliability at the macro-scale was almost 40%, also lower than the results 
obtained in this study. This difference may be due to their use of the HFACS-ADF 
derivative and/or to their methodology of coders coding actual accident reports rather 




 Subsequent to evaluating the overall inter-rater reliability, a finer assessment was 
conducted evaluating the inter-rater reliability of HFACS at the macro-scale for each tier.  
These reliability results for all tiers were considered acceptable except for the Unsafe 
Supervision tier which was found to be substantially and tentatively reliable according to 
Fliess‟ Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha, respectively, perhaps suggesting that at the 
micro-scale one or more categories in this tier lack adequate inter-rater reliability levels.  
Similar to the intra-rater reliability results of HFACS at the macro-scale, the   
inter-rater reliability at the micro-scale ranged from 0.46 - 0.82 based on both Fliess‟ 
Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha. Although these agreement coefficients used in this 
study take into account agreement by chance, these results are almost 3 times higher than 
Olsen‟s (2011) using percent agreement. This difference is probably due to the training 
method and/or because percent agreement is confounded by the number of categories 
coded, meaning the denominator of percent agreement for some pairs differed in Olsen‟s 
(2011).   
Based on the inter-rater agreement coefficient values for each causal category, the 
HFACS categories can be grouped into four levels: acceptable, substantial/tentative, 
mixed, and low/very low. The acceptable group consists of the 3 categories – Physical 
Environment, Failed To Correct a Known Problem and Organizational Climate – 
indicating both an internal consistency for each coder and that all coders had a 
consistently similar understanding of these 3. The substantial/tentative group includes 7 




Limitations, Communication and Coordination Planning, Fitness for Duty, and 
Organizational Process. The mixed group, exhibiting substantial and unreliable levels 
based on Fleiss‟ Kappa and Krippendorff‟s Alpha, respectively, includes 4 categories – 
Exceptional Violation, Technological Environment, Adverse Physiological State, and 
Resource/Acquisition Management. The fourth low/very low group consists of the 
remaining 5 categories – Skill Based Error, Decision Error, Inadequate Supervision, 
Planned Inappropriate Operations, and Supervisory Violation; these categories also 
suffered low intra-rater reliability levels.  
This decline in reliability probably involves a combination: a decrease in the 
percentage of coders agreeing on classifying a certain number of causal factors into a 
particular category and an increase in the percentage of coders agreeing on classifying 
other causal factors into a particular category. These disagreements can be referred to as 
horizontal and vertical, based on Tables 4.23 and 4.36, which perhaps indicates coding 
difficulties.  More specifically, these coding difficulties might be due to several factors, 
the primary ones being related to the lack of detail in the phrasing of the causal factors, 
the inattention of coders when coding, ambiguous factors, and/or the training.  
Although this research addressed the already known issue of compound causal 
factors, its results suggest a lack of clarity in the phrasing.  For example, one might argue 
that causal factor 84 – the forklift driver under-estimated the container‟s weight, which 
resulted in the forklift tipping over – can be classified into the Decision Error category, 




coder may think that the forklift driver used his vision to estimate the weight, coding it as 
a Perceptual Error. As a result, this causal factor appears to lack enough detail to 
determine with certainty and confidence the appropriate category. This problem is 
anticipated in the real world because causal factors that form mishap/accident reports are 
usually prepared by personnel who may not be as thorough or specific as needed.  
In addition, the inattention of some coders might have also contributed to low 
inter-rater and intra-rater reliabilities, because of the large number of causal factors, 95, 
used in this study. This situation impacting particular causal factors Routine Violation, 
Exceptional Violation and Supervisory Violation, an indication that although they have 
identified it as a violation, some inattentively missed the phrasing in the causal factor 
differentiating them. For instance,  some coders, approximately 11%, identified causal 
factors 23 and 25 as Routine Violation category, the phrasing – to control insects, the 
supervisor uses unauthorized pesticides in the hotel‟s garden areas – and – the night shift 
supervisor encourages maintenance crews to “bend the rules” in order to complete work 
orders on time – suggested that these were Routine Violations since they might be 
tolerated by top management; however, these coders missed that they are committed by 
supervisors rather than operational workers, indicating them as Supervisory Violations. 
Similarly, the phrasing of causal factor 17 – the shift supervisor was mentally tired after 
working two shifts – was classified by 11% of the coders as an Adverse Physiological 
State category, suggesting that several coders missed the word “mentally” in front of tired  





In addition, ambiguous factors that may contribute to the low reliability levels, 
especially for the inter-rater type, may be due to differences in coders themselves, 
including age, gender, experience, educational background, and personal character.  In 
addition, to a less extent, this decline in reliability may also be due to the possibility that 
the HFACS categories are not exhaustive, mutually exclusive, a situation not in the scope 
of this research. Furthermore, research has found that for taxonomies including a 
hierarchy of exhaustive, mutually exclusive categories, like HFACS, coder agreements 
are expected to vary according to specific training requirements (Annett & Duncan, 
1967), affecting both the inter-rater and intra-rater reliability levels. To address this issue, 
the HFACS training should be designed to decrease coder agreement variation to a level 
that does not influence the reliability of each HFACS category.  
As past research has found, training is a significant factor affecting the intra-rater 
and inter-rater reliability, with levels being found to be higher for trained coders than for 
the untrained ones, especially for intra-rater reliability (Weigle, 1998); more importantly, 
it has been found that reliability levels can be improved if coders receive classroom 
training (Shohamy, Gordon & Kraemer, 1992). The lack of control of the training in this 
study was intended to use real world HFACS training programs, which can be considered 
a limitation as the researcher did not have control over the training, including the 
material, the examples covered, and the level of the instructor. While various causal 
factors indicate that some coders had issues with how to code, others could not 





Teaching coders how to code is a fundamental component of any HFACS 
training; although this was addressed in the training aligned with this study, some coders 
still had issues with how to code. The primary such issue involved coders coding were 
based on the consequence of the causal factor rather than the literal statement and the 
facts included in it. For example, factor 46 – the construction worker was smoking 
marijuana during work without knowledge of top management – was coded by some as 
Adverse Physiological State or Adverse Mental State indicating that they based their 
decision on the physical and/or mental consequence of smoking marijuana, rather than 
focusing on the illegal act of the worker at the operational level, suggesting an 
Exceptional Violation category. Similarly, causal factor 75 – the technical worker lacks 
the type of skills and performance levels required for an acceptable level of job 
competency – was coded by a few as Inadequate Supervision or Resource/Acquisition 
Management, indicating that they based their coding on the previous event of who was 
responsible for hiring this worker as opposed to focusing on the fact that this worker 
lacked the mental abilities to do the job successfully, denoting a Physical/Mental 
Limitation.   
In addition, some coders could not distinguish between certain categories 
belonging to the same tier, perhaps implying training weaknesses represented by lack of 
emphasis, explanation or examples. For instance, some coders couldn‟t differentiate 
between Skill Based Errors and Decision Errors; although the majority of the coders, 
89%, identified causal factors  6, 49, 51, and 65  as being an Unsafe Act committed at the 




them as Skill Based Errors. Similarly, while 80% of the coders identified causal factors 
12, 64, 72, 79, and 83 as an Unsafe Act, 20% of these coders classified them as Skill 
Based Errors and the remaining classified them as Decision Errors. These results suggest 
that these coders, 12% and 20%, realized these causal factors were Unsafe Acts 
committed at the operational level; however, they couldn‟t differentiate the different level 
of conscious demand required by the two: Decision Errors requires medium to high 
conscious demand, while the Skill Based Errors requires no conscious demand, as it is 
spontaneous in nature. Similarly, to a less extent some coders confused Perceptual Error 
with either Skill Based Error or Decision Error.   
Another issue relating to training may involve providing simple examples to 
trainees, impacting the trainees‟ ability to think beyond obvious examples. For instance, 
coders classified causal factor 2 – the inadequate layout design of the equipment in the 
plant forces the workers to take routes other than the designated ones – to either Physical 
Environment or Technological Environment. The discussion of this causal factor with the 
training instructor revealed that complex examples such as layouts of equipment and 
design considerations were not included in the training. 
Coder training appears to be the solution to the majority of the problems 
mentioned here. Research in the education assessment domain has found that properly 
designed training can improve reliability (Graham et al, 2012). In this domain, Frame of 
Reference (FOR) training was developed to foster common and consistent understanding 
among raters of the rating system. A similar method, FOR-HFACS training, could be 




taxonomy. This FOR-HFACS training may specifically involve an explanation and 
process overview of using the HFACS as an accident investigation and analysis tool, a 
thorough explanation of each HFACS tier and category focusing on differences that 
distinguish similar categories, a discussion of common errors through examples of how to 
avoid bias, and training on the proper way of coding, covering the mental process and 
key words/concepts for example.      
While one of the conclusions from this study is designing and developing a 
training program for HFACS, the most significant findings of this study was the 
consistency of the inter-rater reliability results between the two sessions. For example, 
the difference in the values of all agreement coefficients between the first and second 
session for the overall inter-rater reliability for the macro-scale tier level was below 1%, 
shown in Table 5.2. In addition, this conclusion is also supported by the 1% difference in 
the values of all agreement coefficients between the first and second session for the 
overall inter-rater reliability for the micro-scale category level, shown in Table 5.3, 
despite the time difference of 2 weeks between the two sessions. 
 
Table 5. 2: Comparison of Overall Inter-rater Reliability Results Between First and 
Second Session for Tier Level  
 First Session  Second Session  
Agreement Measure Overall 
95% CI for 
Overall 
Overall 




84.77% (84.67, 84.87) 85.25% (84.99, 85.55) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.79 (0.79, 0.79) 0.80 (0.79, 0.80) 






Table 5. 3: Comparison of Overall Inter-rater Reliability Results Between First and 
Second Session for Category Level  
Agreement Measure 
First Session  Second Session  
Overall 
95% CI for 
Overall 
Overall 




68.69% (68.52, 68.86) 68.10% (67.97, 68.52) 
Fleiss' Kappa 0.67 (0.67, 0.67) 0.66 (0.66, 0.66) 
Krippendorff's Alpha 0.67 (0.66, 0.68) 0.66 (0.65, 0.67) 
 
Similarly, the variability of all agreement coefficients values between the first and 
second sessions for the inter-rater reliability of HFACS at the macro scale for all tiers 
was also within 1%, as shown in Table 5.4. However, this variability increased reaching 
to 4% for all agreement coefficients values between the first and second sessions for the 
inter-rater reliability of HFACS at the micro scale including all categories. This low 
increment in variability supports the consistency of the inter-rater reliability results 
regardless of the time difference of 2-weeks between the two sessions, perhaps indicating 
the inter-rater reliability levels of HFACS for practicing coders. 
Table 5. 4: Comparison of Inter-rater Reliability Results for Each HFACS Tier Between 
First and Second Session  
HFACS Tier 
First Session  Second Session  
KF 95 % CI KF  KF 95 % CI KF  
Unsafe Acts Tier 0.82 (0.81, 0.82) 0.82 0.82 (0.82, 0.83) 0.82 
Preconditions of 
Unsafe Acts Tier 
0.80 (0.80, 0.80) 0.80 0.81 (0.81, 0.82) 0.80 
Unsafe Supervision 
Tier 
0.73 (0.73, 0.73) 0.73 0.74 (0.74, 0.75) 0.73 
Organizational 
Influences Tier 







Table 5. 5: Comparison of Inter-rater Reliability Results for Each HFACS Category 
Between First and Second Session  
 
HFACS Category 
First Session  Second Session  








Skill Based Error (SBE) 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.54 
Decision Error (DE) 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 
Perceptual Error (PE) 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.71 
Routine Violation (RV) 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 




















Physical Environment (PhE) 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 
Technological Environment (TE) 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.61 
Adverse Mental State (AMS) 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 
Adverse Physiological State (APS) 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.58 
Physical / Mental Limitations (PML) 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.75 
Communication Coordination & Planning 
(CC) 
0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 















Inadequate Supervision (IS) 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.52 
Planned Inappropriate Operations (PIO) 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.52 
Failed To Correct a Known Problem 
(FTCNP) 
0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 
















Resource / Acquisition Management (RAM) 0.62 0.62 0.66 0.66 
Organizational Climate (OC) 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.82 
Organizational Process (OP) 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.67 
 
In addition, the consistency established here is further supported by the similarity 
of the inter-rater reliability levels for the two sessions, although the number of coders 




The large sample size of coders used in this study, may have contributed to this 
consistency, probably reflecting intra-rater and inter-rater reliability levels of HFACS for 
practicing coders. In addition, the large sample size also played an important role in 
reducing variability and achieving similar inter-rater reliability results within each session 
across all levels, both with and without rogue coders and with and without compound 
causal categories; because the larger the sample size, the more it represents the 
population mean and reduces the variability within the sample.  
Furthermore, this consistency is also strengthened by the similarity of the values 
achieved using different agreement coefficients, especially for those agreement 
coefficients that take agreement by chance into account. The results of these agreement 
coefficients converge to similar interpretations, despite the difference in their 
computations and properties. Percent agreement results were highest among the 3 
agreement measures used, while the other 2 which take agreement by chance into 
account, were lower; specifically, Krippendorff‟s Alpha was the most conservative 









CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND  FUTURE WORK 
This research furthers the research field of HFACS and its validity as its goal was 
to investigate its reliability focusing on both intra-rater and inter-rater, including 
individual tiers and categories.  This study supplements past research by using a large 
sample size of 125 coders rather than 3 or 4 coders. Furthermore, these coders were 
safety professionals from several industries who received similar HFACS training, while 
in other studies they were either human factors specialists or pilots. Moreover, this study 
used actual incident/accident data from various industries represented by 95 causal 
factors, whereas past research has focused mainly on accident data from the aviation 
sector.  
More importantly, this study used more than one statistical measure to evaluate its 
reliability, allowing for a more detailed interpretation of the degree of the reliability, 
compared to a single statistical measure that provides limited information. The results of 
the 3 statistical measures – percent agreement, Krippendorff‟s Alpha (), and Cohen‟s 
Kappa (K) – converge to suggest that the overall intra-rater reliability of HFACS is 
acceptable. Although, its inter-rater reliability determined using percent agreement, 
Krippendorff‟s Alpha (),and Fleiss‟ Kappa (KF) is also reasonable, the values of these 
measures were close to the minimum threshold. In addition, while the findings also 
suggest that the 4 tiers of HFACS are reliable, not all of the 19 categories are reliable. 
This finding is the cause for considerable concern and further research is required.  
Future studies on the reliability of HFACS should be designed to include coders 




that were adopted here. In this study here pre-identified causal factors were used instead 
of actual incident/accident reports because the researcher had no control over training. In 
such potential studies, the evaluation of reliability could individually focus on the 
identification of causal factors from incident/accident reports, the coding of causal factors 
into HFACS causal categories, and then on both together.   
The findings also suggest that additional consideration needs to be given to the 
HFACS training. In addition to the idea of developing FOR-HFACS training, the 
effectiveness of this training program is assessed first by evaluating reliability then 
identifying issues within this program and what elements need to be improved in the 
training to increase its coder consistency.  Moreover, the effect of coder training using 
FOR-HFACS could be evaluated by comparing its reliability to 2 groups, no training and 
common training programs using between-subjects research design, hypothesizing    
FOR-HFACS training would improve reliability.  
Specifically for training purposes, future work may include designing and 
establishing a tool, for example a flowchart, with the intention of increasing the reliability 
of HFACS. This flowchart could assist coders in the process of correctly classifying the 
mishap/accident causal factor into the appropriate HFACS causal category. The flowchart 
would begin by asking the coder sequential questions until he/she accurately identifies 
the tier to which the causal factor belongs; then for each tier this process is repeated with 
an additional set of questions until the correct HFACS causal category is determined. In 




an application. One of the advantages of this online tool is it can function as a refresher 
training, enhancing the coding process when needed.  
Reliable HFACS data is essential for empirical research on safety systems and on 
the effectiveness of any mitigation and/or accident prevention plans and strategies. Once 
a company has classified its accident and near miss cases using the HFACS taxonomy, it 
can analyze these data searching for trends which point to weaknesses in certain areas of 
the system. In addition, conducting association analysis among HFACS categories can 
help identify additional areas for improvement. Information of this nature not only 
provides the safety professional with supplementary knowledge to guide limited 
resources towards a more focused intervention, but also offers benefits to worker health 
through lowering frequency and severity of work accidents, all of which have a positive 
impact on cost. 
HFACS reliability studies have an important role in advancing safety practices, 
techniques, and training. While this study furthers the research field of HFACS and its 
validity, the design study adopted here, including the results and how to test reliability, is 
applicable not only to safety taxonomies in particular but to all taxonomies used in 
various industries including healthcare, computer science and education. Because it is 
crucial that the data derived using taxonomy be defect free from bias and noise and have 
the same meaning for all users. Conducting reliability studies would, by time, enhance 
confidence in existing tools and provide trustworthy and reliable data that reflects 




























Appendix A: Google Form 
 
Please classify all the causal factors to the appropriate causal code. You 
are required to work independently. 
What is your primary email address?    
 
 
1. The Fire Dept. failed to provide fire proof clothing for the firemen for they were 
expensive.  
 Skill Based Error 
 Perceptual Error 
 Decision Error 
 Routine Violation 
 Exceptional Violation 
 Physical Environment 
 Technological Environment 
 Adverse Mental State 
 Adverse Physiological State 
 Physical / Mental Limitations 
 Communication Coordination and Planning 
 Fitness for Duty 
 Inadequate Supervision 
 Planned Inappropriate Operations 
 Failed To Correct a Known Problem 
 Supervisory Violation 
 Resource / Acquisition Management 
 Organizational Climate 
 Organizational Process 
 




2. The inadequate layout design of the equipment in the plant forces the workers to take 
routes other than the designated ones. 
 
3. No procedure exists to ensure that only vegetable oils are ordered for all kitchen 
operations.  
 
4. Workers working for company X are afraid to get things wrong or to admit to making 
mistakes because of the blame attitude. 
 
5. The operator in the control room was colorblind and was not able to distinguish 
between different lights of the control panel. 
 
6. Although, the worker has experience working with the saw and scrap materials, the 
worker forgot to adequately purge the tank and test for vapors before beginning to cut. 
 
7. The nurse‟s mental capability degraded as the number of critical patients increased in 
the ER. 
 
8. The chief engineer provided incorrect performance feedback to the worker. 
 
9. The plant supervisor established work quotas that only the most skilled employees 
could complete safely and effectively.  
 
10. While off-duty, a miner went to the gym and overexerted himself.  
 
11. The day shift maintenance crew failed to tell the swing shift operators that the valve 
line-up was completed.  
 
12. The doctor based his decision on intuition rather than requesting  extra investigations 
from the patient, such as x-rays, blood tests …etc. 
 
13. The tsunami caused water intrusion into the emergency diesel generator rooms.  
 
14. The fire suppression system is outdated and does not accurately reflect modern, 
upgraded equipment status.  
 
15. A night shift driver with a severe cold and congestion fell asleep while transporting a 
load. 
 
16. The utility manager did not provide guidance before allowing new employees to 
operate the machinery. 
 





18. Habitually, the construction workers in company X do not wear personal protective 
equipment in the working area. 
 
19. The boss assigned two waitresses with a history of personal quarrel to the same work 
shift.  
 
20. The supervisor authorized blasting activities knowing full well that the established 
blast safety zone was not according to the mines blasting rules and procedures. 
 
21. Top management only values employees current results, disregarding employees level 
of commitment, previous performance ...etc. 
 
22. The construction manager's instructions were vague to the worker and the worker did 
not seek clarification. 
 
23. To control insects, the supervisor uses unauthorized pesticides in the hotel‟s garden 
areas.  
 
24. The two monorail trains were identical, which caused confusion to the operator. 
 
25. The night shift supervisor encourages maintenance crews to “bend the rules” in order 
to complete work orders on time.  
 
26. The nuclear plant equipment operator told his supervisor about the leaking pipe, but 
the supervisor took no action.  
 
27. The forklift driver was poisoned after eating contaminated food. 
 
28. The operator misread the gauge meter and recorded a false reading. 
 
29. The doctor customarily does not wash his hands in between patients.  
 
30. The night shift custodial crew is afraid to voice concerns due to threatened retaliation 
by management.  
 
31. The chief engineer assigned a job that was beyond the capability of the crew. 
 
32. The company events manager failed to inform hotel staff that a congressman was 
spending the night.  
 
33. The captain of the ship did not hold a merchant mariner license. 
 
34. A large gust of wind caused an opened gate to close unexpectedly setting off a 





35. The poor working relationships between company employees lead to a sense of 
isolation among employees. 
 
36. The mine lacks sufficient standard operating procedures (SOPs) and policy standards.  
 
37. The frequency of sampling and testing is decreased to every four hours instead of 
every hour at the wastewater treatment plant, due to budget cuts.  
 
38. The supervisor created a work plan that did not address some very important safety 
precautions and risks.  
 
39. The floors in the kitchen areas are slippery and wet.  
 
40. The company is trying to save money and bought improper equipment that has been 
improperly guarded. 
 
41. The workshop supervisor always criticizes the work of his employees. 
 
42. The company did not develop and establish a training program for employees on the 
proper procedures of safety rules. 
 
43. The second shift workers failed to inform the third shift workers of a hazard found 
during the course of their shift.  
 
44. The instruments failed to indicate that the vessel was drifting. 
 
45. Although, the chief electrical engineer was notified of the hazard in the electric room 
he did not initiate a plan to eliminate the hazard. 
 
46. The construction worker was smoking marijuana during work, without knowledge of 
top management. 
 
47. The engineer got stressed as the project deadline approached. 
 
48. The head of the mechanical group was unable to solve/manage a conflict between two 
of his group members. 
 
49. The security officer missed a check on his normally scheduled rounds.  
 
50. The pool lifeguard was out all night partying and fell asleep on the job.  
 
51. The worker inattentively isolated the incorrect equipment/machinery during 





52. The worker signed off a maintenance sheet without performing the maintenance or 
inspecting the work, which is against the rules and regulations. 
 
53. A tremendous hail storm destroyed the atrium‟s glass enclosure.  
 
54. The waitress, against published rules and top management policy, reheated the dinner 
guest‟s prime rib in the microwave.  
 
55. The supervisor was informed of brake issues for one of the two haul trucks, but did 
not make it a priority to ensure that it was fixed before it was used again.  
 
56. Work order systems and processes have become too cumbersome and need revision.  
 
57. The mine contracts with outside personnel without doing background checks or 
checking that their qualifications are up-to-date. 
 
58. The worker only slept three hours the previous night even though he was required to 
obtain 8 hours of crew rest. 
 
59. The company lacks a program for frequent and regular inspections of the job site, 
materials, and equipment by a competent person. 
 
60. The lab supervisor did not staff the lab adequately for timely response to emergent 
and urgent issues due to competing priorities. 
 
61. The road maintenance worker, with the full knowledge of management, always 
smokes while working.  
 
62. The operator misjudged the length of the boom and inaccurately determined the load 
radius.  
 
63. The new chef did not receive adequate mentoring and coaching when he was hired.  
 
64. The captain chose to continue fishing despite the severe weather predictions and the 
exposed location of the ship "Katmai".  
 
65. The new chef burned the dish due to his poor braising technique.  
 
66. The brick mason assistant was tired, after lifting 30 lbs. of brick continuously for two 
hours without a break.  
 
67. Although against the rules, housekeepers routinely use the indoor executive pool on 





68. Not to his nature, the worker intentionally misused his personal protective equipment. 
 
69. The receptionist just had an argument with her spouse and snapped at a rather 
demanding guest.  
 
70. The bulldozer driver missed his allergy medication the previous night and instead 
took it in the morning before work.  
 
71. The maintenance man had hearing deficiencies and was not able to hear the fire 
alarm. 
 
72. The mechanic selected the wrong procedure to fix the hydraulic pump. 
 
73. The day shift foreman failed to inform the swing shift of a large baking order required 
for completion by next morning.  
 
74. The chief engineer inspected the construction site without using personal protective 
equipment. 
 
75. The technical worker lacks the type of skills and performance levels required for an 
acceptable level of job competency. 
 
76. The organization rewards successful risk takers and punishes those who slow down or 
halt a process for safety concerns. 
 
77. The lighting in the laundry facility is inadequate.  
 
78. Plant equipment operators routinely enter the switchyard without first contacting the 
control room.  
 
79. The new operator recognized a malfunction in the equipment, but chose the wrong 
remedy to fix it. 
 
80. The operator showed up for work while the effect of alcohol is still present. 
 
81. The head crane operator misjudged the correct position to load the steel bars, which 
resulted to a risky imbalanced horizontal transportation.   
 
82. The apprentice nuclear plant equipment operator was not tall enough to read the site 
glass gauges.  
 
83. The maintenance engineer, having limited knowledge of the new air conditioning 





84. The forklift driver under-estimated the container‟s weight, which resulted in the 
forklift tipping over. 
 
85. The restaurant lacks an adequate employment selection process resulting in the hiring 
of personnel who have infectious diseases that are inappropriate for the job. 
 
86. Against rules and regulations and without supervisor knowledge, a miner randomly 
jumped onto the back of a haul truck and used it as an unauthorized form of 
transportation across the work site. 
 
87. The temperature gauge in the freezer has been broken for weeks, but the local 
restaurant management refuses to fix it.  
 
88. The accountant was stressed about losing his job because of the downsizing in the 
company. 
 
89. The worker experienced moderate trembling due to blood sugar insufficiency.  
 
90. The new haul truck driver is not tall enough to reach the pedal controls on the haul 
truck.  
 
91. The nurse misread the reading of the blood pressure monitor. 
 
92. The electrical operator got distracted by an external noise and forgot to take readings 
on the main transformer.  
 
93. The warehouse forklift driver was suffering from a severe head cold, took OTC 
drugs, became groggy and dropped a load of boxes.  
 
94. On rainy days the hotel entryway gets slippery, but the supervisors haven‟t taken 
steps to fix the problem.  
 
95. The font size and coloring schemes on control room labels creates confusion when 










Appendix B: Consent 
Information Concerning Participation in a Research Study Clemson University 
Assessment of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS): Inter-rater and Intra-rater Reliability 
 
Description of the Research and Your Participation 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Awatef Ergai under the 
direction of Dr. Scott Shappell and Dr. Anand K. Gramopadhye. The purpose of this 
research is to evaluate the reliability of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS).  
 
This study will take place over two coding sessions subsequent to training. The first 
session will occur immediately at the end of the HFACS training, and the second two 
weeks later. In each coding session you will be given a survey which is composed of 
various causal factors along with a list of HFACS causal codes and your task is to read 
and classify each factor into the causal code that best describes it by checking the 
appropriate box. The amount of time required for your participation in each session will 
not exceed one hour. 
 
Risks and Discomforts 
 




This research will help us to evaluate the reliability of the HFACS framework and to 
identify any weaknesses in the structure of the HFACS and thus refine the HFACS 
framework to a more trustworthy and dependable framework. 
 
Protection of Confidentiality 
 
We will do everything we can to protect your privacy. Your identity will not be revealed 




Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate 
and you may withdraw your consent at any time. You will not be penalized in any way 
should you decide not to participate or to withdraw from this study. 





If you have any questions or concerns about this study or any problems arise, please 
contact Dr. Dr. Anand K. Gramopadhye at Clemson University at 864-656-5540. If you 
have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact 
the Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-6460 or 
irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the 
ORC‟s toll-free number, 866-297-3071. 



















































Skill Based Error 1 1 
Decision Error 1 2 
Perceptual Error 1 3 
Routine Violation 1 4 
Exceptional Violation 1 5 
Physical Environment 2 6 
Technological Environment 2 7 
Adverse Mental State 2 8 
Adverse Physiological State 2 9 
Physical/Mental Limitations 2 10 
Communication Coordination and 
Planning 
2 11 
Fitness for Duty 2 12 
Inadequate Supervision 3 13 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 3 14 
Failed To Correct Problem Known 
Problem 
3 15 
Supervisory Violations 3 16 
Resource Management 4 17 
Organizational Climate 4 18 
Organizational Process 4 19 




Appendix D:  Identification of Rogue Coders 
Rogue coders were identified and excluded from the analyses using percent 
agreement values of the 125 coders who participated in the first session. Every coder was 
paired with the other 124, and percent agreement was determined, yielding a sample of 
15,500 percent agreement values. Given the size of this dataset and the visual 
representations of the dataset --histogram, box plot, and normal probability plot -- seen in 
Figure D.1 suggest that the data are approximately normally distributed with a sample 
mean of percent agreement of 68.49% and a sample standard deviation of percent 
agreement of 7.78%: 
 




The empirical rule -- percent agreement percent agreement
2*x s
-- was used to identify a rogue 
coder (Wilcox, 2010), which generated a lower cutoff value of 52.92% for this dataset. A 
coder exhibiting a percent agreement value less than this amount 22% or more of the time 
when paired with other coders was considered rogue. The five coders subsequently 
identified as rogue coders were not included in the analysis, reducing the sample size to 
120 coders. These coders exhibited percent agreement values less than the criterion 72%, 
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